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1

PROLOGUE
Most Greek tragedies end right at the moment when the characters’ alienation is
at its peak. Only a few stride further. In this seldom-charted space, everything is darker;
the stage is no longer lit. You must imagine a hero—or perhaps a man who was once a
hero—groping around in the dark with his arms extended, helpless, trying to maneuver
through the ruins of his world that lies in shambles at his feet. He stumbles and falls
repeatedly. He starts to ask himself “why,” but the darkness is silent and the world
refuses to provide him with an answer. This project shines a light into these dark spaces. I
take self-alienation and the consequences it arouses after tragedy as my foundation for
examining the works of two infrequently paired writers: Euripides and Albert Camus.
At the center of my intellectual life is a deeply rooted fascination with the works
of Camus. The utter warmth of his deserts and the lingering presence of a sea close by
have always been somewhat of a home for me. But the questions that initiated this project
had nothing to do with him at first. Rather these questions were directed at one tragedy of
Euripides’ in particular: Heracles.
How is any reader to make sense of this drama’s disorienting structure and
contradictory reversals? I became devoted to finding an answer, and the reason that this
tragedy struck me so much at first, I believe, was simply because it reminded me of more
familiar récits. I let what for me was a natural connection take its course. As a result, the
project arose out of an effort to read this confounding and frequently overlooked-tragedy
through Camus’ eyes. Soon enough, as I strayed into the brilliant and decadent web of
Euripides’ tradition, I found that these two writers were attempting to understand a
similar darkness. More specifically, the darkness that exists at the end of Heracles, the
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one pervading The Myth of Sisyphus, and the one at the heart of The Fall all seemed to
harmonize with one another. It is a darkness defined by the experience of man becoming
conscious of himself after tragedy. Whether or not a modern lens can lead to an authentic
reading of an ancient tragedy, or that a distant past can truly be used to make sense of a
recent present is not something I seek to answer—though I will not say that such a thing
is starkly impossible. Rather, my goal in this project is to show how two distinct cultures
and literary works communicate with each other in order to make light of a more broadly
human experience that reoccurs throughout time.
Performed in 416 B.C., towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, Heracles is a
tragedy unlike others in its genre. To a naïve, modern reader of Greek tragedies—as my
experience once informed me—the dramas have an ancient and mystical aura to them.
They feel calculated and accomplished in the same way that the Parthenon is
dimensionally perfect or that the ancient bronze sculptures show the human body not as it
is but in the ideal state of what it should be. Aeschylus’ The Orestia puts an end to
generations of violence and revenge-atrocities with a grand symphonic-style ending
marked with the bang of Athena’s gavel in a divinely orchestrated court of civil justice.
Likewise, the heroine of Sophocles’ Antigone courageously offers her young life and
entire future of happiness in order to ensure the preservation of honor in the war-torn city
of Thebes. As a modern reader, the sentiment that ran throughout these tragedies was one
of nostalgia: that this is what man once was.
None of this nostalgia, however, can be found in Heracles. This drama renders
virtue, justice, and the semi-divine Heracles himself entirely unrecognizable by the end.
Everything from the characters to the plot and the values instilled within get caught up in
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a disorienting sea of contradictions. The sense of unity and heroic spirit had been
evacuated. Reading it didn’t feel like an excavation of an ancient past, a stretch across a
large, incomprehensible expanse of time. It was recognizable, as if I were merely looking
out the window into a much more recent past. For so long, many classical scholars would
write that Euripides’ Heracles seemed inconsistent and incomparable to the standards of
the genre—be it the fault of the tragedy, tragedian, or something indefinable. But to me
there appeared a different reason: the heartbeat of Heracles is modern. This belief is
paired with the fact that scholars of the modern period, beginning in the last years of the
19th century, started to ask themselves whether this tragedy is as inferior as they once
thought—as if they only recently acquired the perspective necessary to understand this
anomaly of a drama.1 Something in the way that thinkers have come to see the world in
the past two centuries had been hibernating in the mythos of this drama.
The modern era had reequipped man’s perspective. What was needed was a very
particular understanding of self-alienation, an understanding that is perhaps no better
articulated than from the self-proclaimed “poet of modern life,” Charles Baudelaire. A
19th century French poet succeeding Euripides by some two thousand years, he captures
the very essence of what Heracles experiences in his poem from Les Fleurs du mal,
“L'Héautontimorouménos.” The title is derived from the Greek words Ἑαυτὸν
τιµωρούµενος, meaning “the self tormenter” or “the man who tortures himself.” As the
title foreshadows, Baudelaire’s speaker confronts the self as if it were an “other.” He
enters into a reflexive encounter wherein each threat is a threat doubled back onto
1 I am not alone in this view, as Daniel Mendelsohn argues the very same. Daniel Mendelsohn,
"Herakles: Punished Again!," The New York Review of Books (New York, NY), May 23, 2013. He writes,
“An earlier generation of classicists, more often than not, saw in Herakles a hopeless mess. But we
moderns (and postmoderns) are perhaps better equipped to see the point in the apparent pointlessness of the
action, in the fragmentation, in the hollowing out of convention.”
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himself:
I shall strike you without anger
And without hate, like a butcher,
As Moses struck the rock!
And from your eyelids I shall make

Je te frapperai sans colère
Et sans haine, comme un boucher,
Comme Moïse le rocher
Et je ferai de ta paupière,

The waters of suffering gush forth
To inundate my Sahara.2

Pour abreuver mon Saharah
Jaillir les eaux de la souffrance.3

The poem begins with establishing distinct oppositions between subject and object. They
begin as separate entities acting on one another, the “I” striking “you,” and the “waters”
inundating the “Sahara.” But more than that, they are diametrically opposed to one
another to such an extent that they exhibit a positive and negative relationship. But as the
speaker continues and comes to the pivotal central stanza, he reveals that this relationship
is not at all what it seems:
Am I not a discord
In the heavenly symphony,
Thanks to voracious Irony
Who shakes me and who bites me?

Ne suis-je pas un faux accord
Dans la divine symphonie,
Grâce à la vorace Ironie
Qui me secoue et qui me mord

Here, we discover that the subject and the object at play in this poem are not separate at
all but instead are merely “discord” within the same single, ironic entity. The “harmony”
is a false one. The speaker thus causes us to reframe the stark distinctions between the
subject and object in the beginning as clear enumerations of the same divided-self. What
first appeared as an external struggle proves to be an internal one. Turning the gaze meant
for the “other” inward, the speaker enters into a destructive self-conscious examination.
Irony begins to pervade this internal struggle, and as it does, the speaker himself
falls under threat. He also uncovers that within the divided-self there exists an inherent

2

Charles Baudelaire, William Aggeler, “the Man Who Tortures Himself” in The Flowers of Evil
(Fresno, CA: Academy Library Guild, 1954)
3 Charles Baudelaire, “L'Héautontimorouménos” In Les fleurs du mal: the complete text of The
flowers of evil (Boston: D.R. Godine, 1983), 256.
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evil, a capacity for both virtue and for ruining vice. The imagery created in these final
stanzas shows not just a self doubled, but how its two halves gravely imperil one another:
I am the wound and the dagger!
I am the blow and the cheek!
I am the members and the wheel,
Victim and executioner!
I'm the vampire of my own heart
— One of those utter derelicts
Condemned to eternal laughter,
But who can no longer smile!

,

Je suis la plaie et le couteau!
Je suis le soufflet et la joue!
Je suis les membres et la roue,
Et la victime et le bourreau!
Je suis de mon coeur le vampire
— Un de ces grands abandonnés
Au rire éternel condamnés
Et qui ne peuvent plus sourire!

The divide between subject and object that characterized the beginning is no more.
Instead, the speaker unifies the two under one “I” that recognizes itself as two things. As
a result, the opposition that exists throughout the beginning has transformed into a highly
exaggerated form of self-alienation. Being both “victim and executioner” is the ultimate
fate of the “self-tormentor,” for he is someone whose self-consciousness approaches the
limit of self-annihilation. Once the impossible marriage is made between the one striking
and the one stricken, the self becomes the “vampire,” that alienated being that reflexively
engulfs its “own heart.”
Once Heracles’ tragedy unravels, he becomes a “self-tormentor” in his own right.
But these conclusions—that man is self-consciously alienated, are only the starting point
of this project. Heracles too discovers that the self is contradicting, that the harmony of
the world is distant and incomprehensible, but he takes this inquiry one step further.
Realizing this, is there not a case for suicide? While I cannot claim that no such case like
this one exists elsewhere in the ancient world, philosophies of the modern world deal
with this problem openly and head on. In fact, I look towards these modern philosophies
in order to understand Heracles. Just as Heracles will ask himself this, Albert Camus will
do the same in the Myth of Sisyphus. This essay on the philosophy of the absurd, written
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in the 1940’s, assumes the same set of conclusions reached by the “self-tormentor” and
begins, “there is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.”4
Camus’ philosophy is enriching to this tragedy not just because it contemplates
the same question but also because the questions that both a philosophy of the 20th
century and a drama from the 5th century B.C. ask are born from similar historical ruins
and intellectual environments. Both Euripides and Camus are writers of tragic times.
Writing during or after the time of world-shattering wars, the work of both these
individuals captures the essence of their morally declined and gravely hypocritical
societies. However, I must establish now, this project is not a historical reading of either
of these texts. Through a comparative reading, I am explicating the historical
environments of tragedy—or at least this specific strain of tragedy. And by placing these
similar landscapes next to one another, I do not mean to imply that such landscapes are
unique to these points in history. In fact, I intend to suggest the opposite. That these
environments can be recognizable over two thousand years apart, geographically
separated by thousands of miles, shows only that they are timeless landscapes—tragedy
eternally reappearing. The “self-tormentor” can find his home anywhere.
The first step to answering my initial question was to address the bigger question
as to how to approach a comparative project with such large proportions. While I am
indebted in many cases to the traditional scholars who have written on these various
texts—and one will find that their influence is surely present—this untraditional project
required an untraditional approach.

4 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York:
Vintage Books, 1991), 6.
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The first part of this project looks at how Euripides’ Heracles manifests these
problems in a way unlike most other Greek tragedies. In order to read and understand
how this unique space of confrontation functions, a different critical framework is
necessary than what scholars traditionally rely on. Knowing that the guidelines espoused
in Aristotle’s Poetics would be ineffective in this regard, I use Camus’ the Myth of
Sisyphus as a lens to interpret the drama’s latter segments. Using this framework, I
explore how the disjointed construction of Heracles is mirrored in the psychological
crisis of the self that the protagonist comes to experience, helping us to understand the
highly criticized, final segment of the drama which confronts the question of suicide.
The second part looks to the future and how Camus’ later work, The Fall,
complicates this problem. My analysis will progress through his dizzying récit in order to
arrive at Clamence’s illusive and damning conception of falling. Awaiting our arrival is a
man grown accustomed to this darkness. His narrative is one of undoing. If Heracles
embarks from the land out into the sea, then The Fall becomes lost in this sea, seeming to
erase the possibility that there exists anything but the sea.
The heroes of these stories are not who they may seem to be. A god, a lawyer, a
gentleman on the street—these are only who they were. Stumbling in the impenetrable
black of tragedy, they truly discover themselves. What happens to heroes in this
darkness? They fall, of course. Like sailors enticed by the song of the Sirens, they will
heed the charming voices that seem to promise them redemption. Searching endlessly for
the harmony that they desire, our heroes will abandon home and make a life in the sea.
But the song is beautiful all the same. Isn’t it?
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I
HERACLES: A Life Of Hopeless Labor
Euripides’ Heracles, first performed in 416 B.C, has earned a reputation among
the Greek tragedies for being the troubling black sheep of the tragic cannon. Most often,
scholars have a great deal of trouble working through the plot’s confusing and somewhat
contradictory structure. It slips through their fingers, eluding a solid grasp. The drama
begins in Thebes with Heracles’ wife Megara, his three sons, and his mortal father
Amphitryon under threat from Lycus, a tyrant invader wanting to kill the hero’s family
and take the city. Heracles himself is away completing the last of his twelve labors, but as
word spreads that he has descended into the underworld, everyone else, including his
family, believes him to be dead. His desperate family buys time from their deaths, hoping
that he might make a timely return. Indeed he does at the very last minute and defeats
Lycus just in time. Then, without explanation, Iris, messenger of the gods, and Madness5
arrive over the city and cast a spell of mania onto Heracles at the orders of Hera. In this
state, Heracles goes on to murder his wife and his children, sparing Amphitryon. Upon
regaining sanity, Heracles learns of his madness from his father, and in his suffering,
concludes that he must commit suicide to preserve any of his remaining honor. Then,
once more as if by chance, Theseus, whom Heracles saved from the underworld, arrives
in the city upon hearing of Lycus’ tyranny. He convinces Heracles not to end his life but
to leave his suffering and come with him to live in Athens. And thus it ends, the life of
Heracles preserved.
5

Sometimes translated as “Lyssa”
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Because of the drama’s multiple reversals, it is no wonder that so much of the
scholarship surrounding it concerns itself with establishing a sense of unity. For a long
period of time, Heracles simply received little attention at all. Those scholars that did
address it frequently came to the unfortunate conclusion that it is simply “broken
backed,”6 or worse, that it is merely a “grotesque abortion.”7 An early scholar of Ancient
Greek literature, K.O. Müller, wrote of Heracles, “it is altogether wanting in the real
satisfaction which nothing but a unity of ideas pervading the drama could produce,”
because the drama places “in one piece two actions so totally different.”8 Early scholars
like Müller generally argued that Heracles sternly breaks with the classical traditions of
Greek tragedy that one might find in Aristotle’s Poetics. In what is largely considered the
first piece of tragic criticism, Aristotle claims that the actions of plots must be singular,
that they be not “episodic,” and that the events must follow each other in a sequence that
is rational and reflects cause and effect.9 Using this as groundwork, scholars have trouble
reconciling the action of Heracles saving his family with the subsequent action of him
killing them in his madness. In addition to this, the unexplainable entrances of both the
godly messengers and Theseus seem to defy the laws of cause and effect. With these
‘errors,’ classical thinkers have had a difficult time mining out the thematic message (the
‘take-away’) that lies beneath Heracles’ frenzied surface.
We may pause if only for a minute to consider the man behind the tragedy, an
author whose critical reception is not very unlike the reception of the drama in question.
6

G. Murray, Euripides and his Age (London 1914) ch. Iv; Greek Studies (Oxford, 1946), 112.
A. W. Verrall, "Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's 'Heracles' of Euripides." The Classical Review 10,
no. 1 (1896), 43.
8 Karl Otfried Müller, History of the Literature of Ancient Greece (London, 1840), 372.
9
Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Malcolm Heath (London: Penguin, 1996), 70.
7
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Euripides is the last of the three ancient tragedians whose works have survived from the
5th century B.C. Seeing as very few ancient writings from contemporary critics of
tragedy have survived, perspectives of the author are typically drawn from the 19th
century onwards. Classicists widely believed that Euripides broke from the traditions and
conventions of the Greek tragic method most frequently and most irreconcilably, making
him, according to many critics, the inferior tragedian. Friedrich Schlegel articulated at the
dawn of the 19th century what came to be the common problem scholars had with
Euripides. In his works they found “the failure of the parts to mesh with the whole.”10
Adding to this, he found that Euripides’ works sacrificed moral steadfastness for
theatrical embellishments simply in order to shock the audiences. But by the turn of the
century, scholars like A. W. Verrall revived his reputation reframing his untraditional
methods as complex rather than sloppy: “if anywhere we suspect [Euripides] of dullness,
we should quietly mark that place for something which probably we do not
understand.”11 This is the general tone in which Euripidean scholarship has continued
into the 20th and 21st centuries. Although today Euripides is much more positively
received, certain works of his remain difficult to swallow for some classicists. And the
need still arises every so often for a bold scholar to step forth and defend some underappreciated work of his. In the words of Euripidean scholar and translator William
Arrowsmith, when Euripides breaks with tradition “it becomes sacrilege, a crime against
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Ann N. Michelini, Euripides and the Tragic Tradition (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1987), 12.
11 A. W. Verrall, Euripides the Rationalist: A Study in the History of Art and Religion (Cambridge
University, 1895), 119.
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the classics. We respond, if at all, with outraged traditionalism, automatically invoking
that double standard which we seem to reserve for the classics […]”12
While Heracles only receives a small fraction of the attention that Euripides’
more popular works like the Medea or the Bacchae receive, modern criticism has been
friendlier to it than previous centuries. The late 19th century classicist U. von
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff wrote at length on the singular subject of Heracles, and his
work showed an appreciation for its contradictions, identifying them as the very thing
that empowers the work.13 Writing on Wilamowitz’s criticism, A.W. Verrall states that
“the grounds for superiority of this criticism to any which has preceded it lies in
recognizing as intentional, indispensible and all important to the meaning of the
dramatist, the contrast and discord of opposing elements [in the drama]”.14 Thus, it is in
these moments of absurdity that Heracles actually comes to life the most. This line of
thinking would seem to be the only correct way to approach such an anomaly as
Heracles. An analysis that forcibly tries to explain the irrationalities so that they align
with the canonical standards of tragedy is thoroughly damaging to the merits that the
tragedy has to offer.
One of the most striking features of Heracles is that it is divided into two
seemingly disjointed halves. The act of madness divides the plot, at which point the
identities and ideologies of the first part reverse and transform into their opposite form by
the second. My reading will initially focus on the first half up to the madness in order to
show how the reversal contradicts the ideals established in the beginning. From there, I
12

William. Arrowsmith, "A Greek Theater of Ideas." Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the
Classics 2, no. 3 (1963), 36.
13 Michelini, Euripides and the Tragic, 17.
14 A. W. Verrall, 43. I must rely on Verrall’s review of “das Herakles” because Wilamowitz’
work has not been translated from the original German.
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will focus more thoroughly on the events that follow the madness. My greater interest in
the second half is owed to the fact that Euripides shows something there that is largely
absent in other tragedies. Instead of ending right when the character’s lives have been
reversed and their alienation is at its peak, Heracles gives space to answering the
question: what comes after tragedy?
A seminal tragedy like Oedipus Rex comes to a close within moments of Oedipus
learning that he is not the hero he thought he was—his sense of self destroyed. Something
like the Orestia does in fact give space to this question, but instead of showing how the
tragic hero Orestes endures after the world has been given over to disorder, the
Eumenides dedicates itself to rebuilding order and dispelling any remnants of irrationality
through law and order. Within this space so rarely staged, Heracles confronts the
existential consequences of tragedy. Order and meaning given over to chaos, he must
make the choice of what to do next. The question he faces is the quintessential question
of the absurd. Incapable of finding meaning, yet unwilling to give up searching for it, he
must come to reject suicide in all of its forms.
The approach that I wish to take for reading Heracles is a particularly modern
one. Considering my claim that the drama deals with both the tragic and the post-tragic
world, I argue that it has the necessary components to be an absurdist tragedy. I call it
absurd because it shows characters not just experiencing tragedy but, more importantly,
confronting the reality that their world is chaotic and meaningless. Therefore, I intend to
elucidate the events of Heracles through the lens of the philosophy of the absurd in order
to make sense of the drama’s long, post-tragic scene. Seeing as the philosophy of the
absurd only comes about in the 20th century, I will draw exclusively from Albert Camus
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and his philosophical text, the Myth of Sisyphus. Camus does not take an interest in
proving the absurdity of life; rather, his goal is to examine the consequences of man’s
conscious confrontation with the absurd. Thus, I will follow a similar path in that I will
show moments, particularly in the beginning and at the major reversal, where the plot
erects notable irrationalities and how their presence contributes to constructing the
essence of the absurd that is confronted in the latter half.
It is my goal to show that the structural peculiarity of Heracles is not a case for
abandoning ship. The absurdist lens, though not traditional, offers a powerful reading of
this tragedy—one perhaps that it has desperately needed. If others have struggled in
battling the winds of this drama, it is because they sail the likes of a stormy sea that will
not allow itself to be maneuvered by traditional means. I set off into this very storm, at
the mercy of its direction and with a willingness to wind up shipwrecked in an absurd and
tumultuous sea.

Changing the Myth
A characteristic of this tragedy that should inevitably serve as the starting point to
all analyses of Heracles is Euripides’ detour from the standard events of the canonical
myth of Heracles. This includes both reordering the traditional sequence of events and
adding new material to the myth. Perhaps the most evident and significant disparity
between Euripides’ myth and the standard myth is that in the standard myth Heracles is
meant to kill his family and complete his twelve labors as a form of penance. In
Euripides’ version, the labors come before the crime itself, bringing forth many thematic
problems that I will return my attention to later. But one important thing to note about

14
this tragedy is that Euripides is not simply abandoning the traditional myth to tell a new
story; rather, the poetic inventions that Euripides’ makes are constantly at odds with the
standard events of the myth. These two versions, however, cannot coexist. The
tragedian’s changes make the standard myth itself irrational, but at the same time, those
inclusions of the standard myth contradict the story that he appears to be telling. Yet the
tragedy forces them to coexist. So from beginning to end, these two conceptions of the
Heracles story sustain a dramatic tension that frequently forces the plot’s rationale to
break down in certain pivotal moments. Thus, as one scholar eloquently states, “Heracles
makes use of yet abuses the “other world” of myth and in order to do so employs one of
the strangest dramatic structures in the whole of Greek drama.”15
Just as the reordering of the labors is the tragedian’s invention, so too are Lycus
and his invasion of Thebes. As the scene opens, Amphitryon and Megara reveal
themselves to be helpless innocents at the mercy of Lycus. They are, as Amphitryon
himself recognizes, suppliants “upon this altar of Zeus.”16 This sets the stage for what is a
common archetype of tragic plots: the suppliant drama. Often in tragedies one will find
helpless characters fleeing some imminent threat by retreating to the city’s religious
temple. Once there, religious law protects them. For a villain to disregard this law and
continue pursuing his prey or for some bystander not to come to the suppliants’ rescue is
morally reproachable.

15

D. J. Conacher, Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme and Structure (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1970), 82.
16 Euripides, "Heracles," trans. William Arrowsmith, in Euripides III, by Euripides., trans.
William Arrowsmith, et al., 3rd ed. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 47-48. All
references made to Euripides will refer to Arrowsmith’s translation unless otherwise noted. Additionally,
all corresponding citation numbers will refer to line numbers not page numbers.
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The suppliant drama of Heracles is one of a more abject variety. The innocent
duo make it clear from the start that not only will Lycus refuse to show any mercy, but
also no one, not even the mighty Heracles, is going to save them. The tragedy seems to
begin at the end. Yet, despite death quite literally being at the doorstep, it is inexplicable
that Amphitryon maintains such a strong hope for survival. Late in age now, he was an
honorable hero in his own time, but his statements, “We are weak and, being weak,
should play for time./ … I love [life] even now. I love its hopes./ … A cure may come in
wearing out the time”17 run counter to the standard codes of Greek nobility whereby he
should preserve his honor by using his autonomy to take his own life. We see such
nobility in Sophocles’ Ajax, for example: Ajax turns to suicide in order to preserve his
honor after having slaughtered a heard of animals in a state of blind madness. Suicide is
one final act of courage that rids his life of its shame—a dictum in the hero’s handbook.
Being a definitively violent act, suicide rightly goes hand in hand with the heroic.
Interestingly, however, Euripides has given the role of honorable nobility to the female,
as Megara proclaims, “The man who struggles hard against his fate/ shows spirit, but the
spirit of a fool.”18 The dialogue between these two desperate characters in this opening
scene foreshadows the question that will come to dominate the second half of the drama:
that is, whether or not Heracles should commit suicide after disgracing his honor. Megara
may imply that her husband, when in the face of similar ruin, would make the choice that
she voices here, but by the time the reversal arrives, the link between honor and suicide is

17

Euripides, "Heracles," 89, 91, 93.
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questioned—honor not having the same meaning in the end as it does here in the
beginning.
In general, the characterization and inclusion of Lycus has raised a few flags
among critics.19 He is often criticized for being flat because he ultimately lacks any
reprieving qualities that would make him less one-dimensionally evil.20 He is simply bad.
But I believe that his simplistic evil is not to be mistaken for insignificance. He functions
as the most unredeemable symbol of traditional vice. The plot most clearly establishes
this by the fact that Lycus is so blindly intent on overthrowing and killing that he is
willing to commit an act that is considered beyond reproach as an attack against the
religious order. Growing impatient with the suppliants, Lycus threatens to burn down the
temple and altar of Zeus in order to finally end their standoff, “Burn them alive/ until
they have learned the dead man rules no more;/ I, and I alone, am the power here.”21
Although the dead man he refers to is indeed Heracles, it is tempting to look at Lycus’
threat as one issued directly to the divine order. This in fact is more than plausible
considering its connection to the defilement of the religious space, not to mention that
Heracles himself, being the son of Zeus, is just as much representative of divine power as
he is of humanity. It is true, however, that Lycus only sends troops off to find firewood
and that the time never comes to put his words into action, but the gesture to do so is
unprecedented even for a barbarian—a Greek might consider it.
19
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Considering that Lycus is more talk than anything else, the first part of the
tragedy is often criticized for being flat and precarious in its development.22 Kitto argues
that this scene provides very little dramatic action because “Lycus represents nothing but
imminent danger,” and so he argues that Euripides dramatizes only a “negative” in this
first half.23 Lycus undeniably contributes to this “negative,” but not in the way that Kitto
argues. The “imminent danger” that Lycus issues in this half has a very wide spread. He
not only threatens the family of the hero, but he also threatens the honorable reputation of
Heracles, the reputation of the divine, and most of all, the sanctity moral structure. His
very presence invokes a pressing display of justice. In other words, the purpose of Lycus
in this part of the plot is simply to establish the true form of wrong that Heracles will
contrast himself to, but which, by the end, he will ironically come to mirror.
When Heracles arrives, he swiftly defeats the villain and restores order to a city
that had sprung into chaos. Justice prevails. His entrance makes for a brilliant and heroic
image of a man returning against all odds from the underworld, coming to the defense of
desperate suppliants, and living up to his semi-divine status. Though, this image is
fleeting. Slowly coming into focus over the long first half of the drama, this Heracles
lasts only for an instant. Fading too quickly for us to admire it, a few lines later it will be
thrown out of focus once again.
Immediately after Heracles’ success, the messenger gods arrive and bring with
them a life’s worth of ruin. Appearing at what could rationally be the end of the plot, Iris
and Madness arrive just at the time when the audience could expect the deus ex machina
22H.D.F.
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to give the thematic lesson. Typically, when the gods arrive at the end of a tragedy, they
are tasked with surmising the events and relating the morals to the audience in a way that
is within the range of human knowledge. The reason for this interpretative element is
that, as Aristotle states, “to the gods we ascribe the power of seeing all things.”24 The
chorus in Heracles prepares the audience for their arrival and plays upon the expectations
that Aristotle lays forth, singing in their celebratory song, “the gods of heaven do
prevail:/ they raise the good and scourge the bad.”25 What happens instead is not a deus
ex machina, but more a parody of one. Once these messenger gods arrive they serve only
to complicate the drama and plunge the characters into a far darker chaos. Not only they
reject our expectation of divine behavior, but also the tragedy itself seems to be aware of
the irony. The chorus’ song appearing next to such a graceless image of gods shines a
bright light upon the marked dissonance between our perception of the gods and the
reality of how they are.
Appearing more like a villain’s incompetent henchmen than gods, they argue and
stumble over one another on the stage. The overly apparent irony in this scene is that
Madness is serving as the voice of caution and reason. She says, “And I advise both you
and Hera now,/ lest I see you stumble, to hear me out […] renounce these wicked
plans,”26 yet no one is heeding her warning. Madness is forced against her will and put at
the service of the blind revenge, for Iris retorts, “Hera has not sent you down to show
your sanity.”27 The fact that a bickering argument takes place about justice in the first
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place attests to the non-universal and non-definitive nature of justice, unlike the brand of
justice shown just moments before to Lycus. While arguments about the “just” course are
frequent on Mt. Olympus, Euripides has invented this interaction, making a point to stage
such a silly and absurd debate before a human audience. The conclusions they reach,
however, are grave and destructive for the hero. Virtue and reason, the case made by
Madness, is silenced and overridden by power and violence. D.J. Conacher points out in
that this argument “serves to emphasize the gratuitous nature of the gods’ ill-treatment of
the kindly Heracles,”28 noting further how this display of chaotic divinity humanizes
Heracles and separates him from the divine order. His grace is seemingly far above theirs.
The only image that this tragedy provides of true gods is one in which they actively
renounce sanity and order. We can normally expect the gods and humans to have
opposing images, but in this case, the poles have flipped and the human comes out of this
comparison on top. Ultimately, Euripides shows here just how precarious the pillars of
justice truly are, as the messiness of the gods’ arrival mirrors the mess that they make of
the plot.
Looking ahead, knowing that in his madness Heracles will turn upon his family
and finish the task that Lycus started adds a confounding layer to this suppliant drama.
Here lies one of the tragedy’s most senseless irrationalities. It is a thorough contradiction
that all of these endangered subjects—his family, his reputation, and the moral
structure—are laboriously saved, and then, in the very next motion, destroyed by the
same hand. The traditional myth requires only that Heracles murder his family in a state
of mania, but it is only Heracles that necessitates the family to first be saved. This forces
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us to reconsider the “meaninglessness” that Kitto claims plagues this first half. It is not
meaningless in that nothing of merit happens; it is meaningless—one could argue—
because it is rendered meaningless by the events of the drama itself. In this way,
Euripides has given us a tragedy that contains two separate actions that are opposite, or,
in other words, one single contradiction.

The Reversal
Once Heracles goes mad, the long awaited and devastating reversal occurs. Of all
the remaining Greek tragedies, the reversal in Heracles is perhaps the most poignant and
most literal of them all. According to the Poetics, the reversal is simply the “change in
which the action veers round to its opposite, subject to our rule of probability and
necessity.”29 Virtually nothing in this tragedy is exempt from this reversal. The events
turn from good to bad; the hero becomes the villain; and most importantly, order is given
over to chaos, justice over to violence. The first part of the tragedy (until the moment that
the messenger gods arrive) depicts a structured world. There are swift forces that balance
the scales of justice. Quite simply, Lycus acts the villain—he unjustly invades Thebes,
prepares to murder Heracles’ innocent family, and abuses religious law. In response, he is
stopped. In this case, Heracles serves as the arbiter of good, and so the chorus celebrates
the just system in their song, which I will quote once more, “The gods of heaven do
prevail:/ they raise the good and scourge the bad.”30 This illustrates that mankind’s world
operates in a conscious and meaningful system, one in which an ethical code, enforced by
some higher or objective force, establishes order among the chaos of humanity. The first
29
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half of the tragedy is dedicated to creating the appearance of such a system, the very
same system of ordering forces that exists in a majority of other tragedies. But in the case
of Heracles, we receive this moral declaration midway through the drama, and so the
reversal dedicates itself to tearing this very system down, leaving nothing save for
senseless chaos in its place.
How this reversal affects Heracles identity is a more complex matter and will be
the focus of my argument into the tragedy’s second half. In order to establish the
fundamental groundwork of this transformation I will point out some broader
observations about who he is in the beginning. The tragedian’s reordering of the labors
becomes very important in considering this question. The standard, mythical Heracles is
noble and glorified because he is the son of a god, and not just any god, but Zeus himself.
However, Euripides takes this baseline nobility and multiples it by putting the labors
beforehand. Rather than his labors being issued for atonement of a crime, the Heracles of
this drama conducts the labors as a service. They are a self-less attempt to restore
Amphitryon to his native land, from where he has been exile, establishing Heracles as the
good son and the “civilizer” of humanity from the very start of the tragedy.31
Additionally, the standard, mythical character acquires much fame and greatness as a
result of his many labors. The general arc of the mythical concept of “Heracles” is that,
although he is born noble, he commits a great crime early in life and then becomes a
glorified hero through his labors. Once more, since these great labors come beforehand,
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his arc is reversed in that he is already great, commits his crime, and then descends.32 The
potential to rise again no longer exists as it has already passed.
Before moving on the second part of the tragedy, I want to look back and address
some lingering points about the interaction between myth and poetic invention that were
raised earlier on. By reordering Heracles’ timeline, Euripides has effectively produced an
entirely new character that differs from the mythical standard of “Heracles.” At the same
time, Euripides’ Heracles is forced into the same narrative structure that the mythical
character faces, and in doing so, the story breaks down and becomes a contradiction. The
myth and the tragedy offer up two different conceptions of Heracles, so that the actual
hero of the tragedy essentially has an identity that is doubled. Once the madness is carried
through, the last part of the tragedy deals with the discordant union of two opposing
identities that are forced to converge in the singular hero. Thus, Euripides successfully
manipulates the myth of “Heracles” to make his Heracles undergo a dramatic crisis of
self.
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Consciousness and the “Why?”
Once Heracles awakens from his madness he must confront his crime and the
senseless reversal that just destroyed his entire conception of the world. The remainder of
the tragedy is what I am referring to as the “post-tragedy” phase, that is, the period in
which the characters must confront the consequences of the reversal and recognition.
Typically, after the tragic moment passes, the characters realize why it occurred and the
drama ends; thus, Aristotle refers to this as the recognition scene. He defines it as “the
change from ignorance to knowledge” wherein “the best recognition is coincident with
the reversal of the situation.”33 Euripides dramatically complicates the recognition scene,
however, more so than most other tragedies. After waking up from his madness, Heracles
recognizes how the tragedy occurred, but because of the senselessness of it, he is merely
left in darkness. Euripides withholds true understanding from recognition so that, without
it, Heracles must make a choice about his tragic life without comprehension of the
world’s order. For the last half, knowing the world will not offer up any clarity to him, he
must decide whether or not to commit suicide. It is here that we see the hero helplessly
stumbling in darkness.
At this very question is where the philosophy of the absurd makes its beginning.
In the Myth of Sisyphus, the essence of the absurd boils down to the moment where man
begins to think and to reflect upon himself. Before the moment of reflection, man lived a
life of false unity, a life where habit and rhythm built the façade of logic and truth. “One
day,” according to Camus, “the why arises,” and “awakens consciousness.”34 It is through
this awakening that thought discovers a “contradiction.” When man reflects, seeking to
33
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unify and understand the world around him, but each time he comes to face the
unacceptable reality that human reasoning is limited and will necessarily fail to discover
a greater unity.35 Now estranged in this paradoxical thinking, he becomes nostalgic for
the false world of unity that he has embarked from. Seeking to return there, he tries only
harder to order and unify his world, and with each of those attempts, he re-enters this
“vicious cycle” that “stifles all hopes.”36 An impenetrable wall is reached.
Rather than seeing the second half of this tragedy as a disjointed partner to the
first, the events of the latter half address how the hero reacts to the contradiction that his
life has become after the tragedy’s reversal. So as Heracles opens his eyes and faces a
crumbled façade of unity and order, his revival from madness operates as a metaphorical
awakening into consciousness, the moment where the “why” first arises. The dialogue
that ensues between Heracles and his father, and later with Theseus, illustrates a
characteristic that is unusual to the typical characterization of Heracles, one that is in fact
unique to Euripides’ creation. It is the essential and foremost quality of the absurd man:
he is able to engage intellectually with matters of philosophical inquiry.
Normally, the mythical figure “Heracles” is characterized as a physically strong
and violent hero—all at the expense of reasoning and intellect. Euripides scholar and
translator William Arrowsmith writes in his introduction to his translation that Heracles
was “a symbol of unconquerably robust masculine vitality and courage.”37 Writing on the
role of sacrifice in Heracles, Helene Foley points out that Heracles “occupies an unstable
position between beast and god” and that he “frequently undermines the very culture that
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was his function…to protect.”38 In fact, there is no shortage of scholarship that targets
Heracles’ great proclivity for violence. All of it is right to do so, as the mythic character
Heracles is indeed a force to be reckoned with.39
While Foley and other scholars do well to emphasize the general standard of what
Heracles has come to represent in Greek myth, they do not give enough credit to the
novelty of the “Heracles” that Euripides erects in the second part of the tragedy. His
mythological reputation is even maintained by the first part of the tragedy, as we see him
over and over again conquer external crises with heroic strength: all of his labors and his
return to Thebes to overthrow Lycus. But after the central reversal, the type of crisis that
Heracles encounters is revered as well. Suddenly he is faced with an internal one that
engages with problems of self-consciousness and the philosophical merits of suicide.
Critical analysis in general gives little recognition to the way in which Euripides’
Heracles turns away from his physical and violent identity by the end of his tragedy.
Kitto’s work gestures at moments to the path of my analysis, quoting the work of the
Euripidean translator Léon Parmentier,
Euripides’ idea was to purify the crude popular pictures of Heracles, to give a
Heracles who ‘n’est pas seulment le bienfaiteur qui met sa force au service de
l’humanité; il est… capable de supporter noblement une souffrance morale plus
cruelle que toute douleur physique.’40
This change in Heracles’ characterization is perhaps where Euripides’ brilliance shines
forth most vividly. The tragedian has created a tragic environment simply by ironically
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forcing the very symbol of physical strength into the polar opposite world of
psychological turmoil and unbearable self-consciousness. The threat is no longer a villain
or “other” capable of being defeated, but the hero’s own consciousness, whose defeat
would invariably leads to the hero’s own demise. We might say that Sophocles’ Ajax is
placed in the same situation, but his suicide is a result of failing to engage with the
problems of consciousness and sticking to what he knows: heroic violence. He meets
internal problems with physical force. Consciousness has a tendency to destroy the hero.
The window into this psychological conflict only becomes open to the reader at
the moment when Heracles awakens from his madness-induced sleep. Opening his eyes
to a world that is unfamiliar to him, his previous conceptions of justice, virtue, and
identity prove to be inconsistent with his present reality. He exclaims, “For I do not
recognize clearly anything I am used to.”41 Among these, the transformation of Heracles’
self-understanding after the reversal and the feeling of alienation that results has been of
minimal focus for scholars, yet it is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the drama’s
final movement. In many ways, we might summarize the conflict that arises after his
awakening as one in which Heracles must work through “un-knowing” himself, for his
identity becomes problematized and impossible for him to define. This reflexive
investigation is one of the first stages that follow the “why?” of consciousness. Camus
frames it as such:
For if I try to seize this self of which I feel sure, if I try to define and to
summarize it, it is nothing but water slipping through my fingers. I can sketch one
by one all the aspects it is able to assume […] this nobility or this vileness. But
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aspects cannot be added up. This very heart which is mine will forever remain
indefinable to me […] I shall forever be a stranger to myself.42
Once the curtain of Heracles’ mythical heroism, his life of virtuous pioneering in the
name of divine morality, is pulled away, the tragedy exposes a darkness within that does
not align with his understanding of self. Kamerbeek frames the problem of Heracles’ dual
identity well when he argues that, “the very contrast between Heracles the triumphant
savior of part I and Heracles in his madness is the measure of this tragedy.”43 This
contrast, and thus this irony that Heracles embodies two opposing identities at once is the
heart of the drama’s final movement.
Heracles awakens, and the first thing he engages with is not the brutality of the
scene but rather the dissonance he feels within himself. The identity of Heracles had so
long been predicated on his steadfast label as a “hero,” but now he has discovered not
only that he is not who he thought he was, but that he is simultaneously the complete
opposite, “the anti-hero.” His language in his waking speech captures the estrangement
between body and self, finding himself in a state of being that is discordant to how he
feels he should be: “How strangely my muddled senses swim,/ as on a choppy sea… my
breath comes warm,/ torn up unsteadily from heaving lungs…/ and look: I sit here, like a
ship lashed tight with cables binding my chest and arms.”44 As he regains his
consciousness his body still possesses the signs of his crime and madness. He appears to
himself as an “other.” His breath ought to be coming to him calmly, but it comes rapidly;
his limbs should be free, yet they are restrained. Heracles believes himself to be the hero,
42
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but what he’s feeling is the bodily feeling of the “anti-hero.” That Heracles could be out
of breath because he just slaughtered his family or that he could even be the murderer of
his family at all is a thought entirely alien to the extent that it does not even occur to him
as a possibility. He merely acknowledges seeing himself with a sense of otherness.
The end of this speech culminates in a greater truth: he has now become a
stranger to himself. After voicing the dissonance plaguing his being, he concludes by
saying: “I am bewildered. Where can I be? I’m helpless […] For all I took for granted
now seems strange...”45 Bond captures the existential confusion of this last line more
succinctly, “For I do not recognize clearly anything I am used to.”46 The known has
become the unknown, and Heracles’ disorientation comes to a head. Therefore, I suggest
reading Heracles’ words, “where can I be,” with a deeper layer of meaning, putting an
analytical emphasis on the “I.” By the end of this scene, it is Heracles’ unified
understanding of himself that has become lost. The clearly defined limits of the “I” have
been blurred by the otherness he feels in his body and in his breathing. This way, to read
the singular “I” as the thing that is lost, Heracles is foreshadowing the discovery that he is
a duality.
This alienation within the self—seeing a part of the self as a separate object—is
irresolvable for Heracles because it results only in more contradiction. To acknowledge
that he has done these crimes to his family, to recognize his inhumanity would require
him to accept the reality of the divided-self. When it comes time for Heracles to issue
threats and take revenge on the murderer of his family he ends up raising the stakes of
this self-alienation to dangerous heights. He becomes “the self-torturer.” Heracles says,
45
46

Euripides, "Heracles," 1105, 1108.
Bond, Heracles, 1108.

29
“let me avenge my children’s murderer/ let me hurl myself down…”47 Arrowsmith’s
translation shows a reflexivity in Heracles’ imagery that acknowledges a distinct subject
and a distinct direct object, implying that the “me” avenging is separate from “my
children’s murderer” when they are in fact the same. As a result, the image created is of
Heracles being both the punisher and the punished. Even in the second phrase, the
reflexivity in “me” and “myself,” although they are the same, creates the illusion of one
punishing (“me”) and one being punished (“myself”). This self-reflexivity is equally as
present in the original Greek, though agreeably more subtle. The Greek features
“δικαστὴς,”48 typically meaning, “judge” or “juror”; however, some scholars conclude
that given the context of the scene, Euripides uses the word precisely to mean
“avenger.”49 In either case, this is the ultimate contradiction. The “judge” cannot be
capable of judging while simultaneously being worthy of judgment, just like the
“avenger” should not be both the victim and the executioner. With the impossibility of
reconciling these estranged selves—both the heroic Heracles and the anti-heroic
Heracles—the absurd hero is thus born in their forced union: “a stranger to myself and to
the world, armed solely with a thought that negates itself as soon as it asserts itself…”50
As Heracles becomes aware of the irony that pervades his identity, the dividedself creates a striking discord in his inner harmony. This alienation comes to a head in a
long, pitiful speech that he gives to Theseus soon after the Athenian’s arrival. Having to
explain his suffering, not only does Heracles tell his friend what has recently happened
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but he also begins to redefine his entire life history. Aware of his contradicting, dual
identity, Heracles stumbles upon the realization that there has always been a capacity for
duplicity within him. His memories and his past become consumed by his newly realized
discordance: “Let me show you my life:/ a life not worth living now, or ever.”51 In the
fashion of the “self-torturer,” this reflexive process is destructive in every capacity. His
mind has begun to break its “silence,” and, as Camus claims, what was once “the
appearance of unity begins to falter with the first pulsations of a conscious mind.”52
Heracles must unravel his heroic past.
In this review of his life, Heracles reflects upon many of his more foundational
characteristics, and each time he does, he looks to establish a sense of his present
suffering in what he thought were his past triumphs. Looking first to his troubled
parentage, Heracles figures that his life has been reared towards this single ruin:
Take my father first, a man who killed
My mother’s father and, having such a curse,
Married Alcmene who gave birth to me.
When a house is built on poor foundations,
Then its descendents are the heirs of grief.53
Even from before he was born, Heracles begins to unearth traces of his inherent evil,
observing a duality in Amphitryon’s life that is similar to his own. His father is both the
husband of Alcmene and the murderer of her father—the “vampire of his own heart.” We
may understand this “curse” that he refers to as the forced union of contradicting
opposites, that is, the curse of irony. He even makes reference to the misgivings of Zeus
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just a few lines later. Bringing them both into the spotlight, we cannot help but take note
of the fact that Heracles’ divided-self is mirrored by the fact that he comes from two
fathers. The structural metaphor that he employs a few lines after emphasizes how,
through his “poor foundations,” he has merely inherited both his capacity for evil and his
contradicting natures. The more important thing at stake with this observation is that it
shows how Heracles has begun to erode the singular moment in which he becomes guilty.
Rather than conceiving of his crime as the source of his guilt, Heracles implies through
reframing his history that the moment of his downfall has in many ways happened before
the drama began. The conception of himself that he gradually comes to accept, especially
as this dirge of a speech continues, is that he has in fact always been this way.
Continuing his destructive reflections, he pulls all the threads out from the
tapestry of his life one by one until he has made it into an image that mimics the baroness
of his present state. He expounds the insignificance of his labors, asking himself “why
recite all those labors I endured?”54 He realizes that these labors, which earlier in the plot
served as the heroic foundation of his identity, no longer culminate in a praiseworthy
figure.55 In the same motion, he evokes an image not of glorious labor but of hopeless
labor. He recalls his struggle with the Hydra, saying, “I killed the Hydra, the brute whose
heads/ grew back as soon as lopped.”56 Just as Sisyphus rolls his rock up the hill in
hopelessly, Heracles provides his audience with a similar image of him laboring at a
nearly equal futile task, which is perhaps only heightened by the irony that even after
having defeated the Hydra and all the rest of his labors, he now stands without glory.
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What Camus writes of Sisyphus, his own absurd hero, could just as well apply to
Heracles in this very moment: “the whole of [his] being is exerted toward accomplishing
nothing.”57
Eventually his reflection moves from the past and begins looking toward the
dreadful future that awaits him. Connections to eternal suffering and permanent
banishment have multiple appearances in this reflection. For Heracles, these labors were
his path to virtue, but at the end of it, “my last and worst labor has been done:/ I slew my
children and crowned my house with grief.”58 His devotion to virtue has led him to crime,
for which he faces the harsh sentence of lifelong exile. He must leave Thebes, and he
anticipates that his banishment will be one of endless wandering: “rivers and seas cry out
against my crossing over, and I’ll be like Ixion, bound forever to a wheel.”59 The literal
exile from home that he faces merely functions as a physical manifestation of his
psychological alienation. Therefore, his allusion to Ixion could not be more poignant. A
man condemned to roll eternally on a fiery wheel in Hades, he is the epitome of
movement without trajectory, of wandering without end. Likewise, the discordance of
Heracles’ divided-self will never recapture the harmony it once had, and so this hopeless
sentiment is the capstone of his self-estrangement, concluding his speech “Why should I
live? What profit have I, having a life both useless and accursed.”60
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Suicide or Recovery
Thus far we have looked at how a consciousness awakened injects doubt into
Heracles’ understanding of the world, particularly of himself. After turning his thought
inward, he establishes that his life, present and past, has been a combination of
contradictions and hopeless efforts. He has completely uprooted his foundation, and, the
stage for the internal crisis having been set, the question of living becomes the only
question that remains for Heracles. At the height of this dilemma comes the essential
decision according to Camus: “at the end of awakening comes, in time, the consequence:
suicide or recovery.”61 I’ll explain what exactly this consequence entails in one moment,
but before doing so I want to point out some characteristics about how Heracles is forced
to approach this problem. As I mentioned earlier, his conceptions of justice and virtue
have been completely proven wrong by the reversal of the tragedy. Since the events of
the drama have shown him that justice will quickly betray those fighting on its side and
that virtue will unexpectedly lead to crime, he must now face the decision of suicide in
complete darkness in regards to any guiding principles. This is exactly the confrontation
of the absurd: “At this point of his effort man stands face to face with the irrational. He
feels within him his longing for happiness and for reason. The absurd is born of this
confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world.”62
Without a path to guide him any more, Heracles has never experienced such freedom.
The question of “suicide or recovery” is not as straightforward as it might initially
appear. What exactly Camus means by “suicide” requires some explanation because it
has a meaning for him beyond the common, physical interpretation. Camus looks at his
61
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philosophy of the absurd as an equation that must be preserved, and to “recover”
effectively means to preserve this equation.63 The first term of this equation is man’s
nostalgia, which is the part of us that perpetually yearns for understanding. The second
term is the utter irrationality of the world, that is, “the impossibility of reducing this
world to a rational and reasonable principle.”64 The ways in which man could destroy the
equation and violate its terms are through suicide, of which there are two forms. Physical
suicide is the form that eliminates the first term of the equation. By killing oneself, man
symbolically states that he no longer yearns for life and understanding. The second form
of suicide is philosophical suicide. This form is responsible for eliminating the second
term of the equation: irrationality. The act of philosophical suicide refers to man
assigning a unity or meaning to the world’s irrationality that is beyond human
comprehension. In most cases, this takes the form of religion: man ascribes what he does
not understand to being the domain of a god—“instead of saying ‘This is absurd’ man
says ‘This is God!”65 Such an assignation makes the world’s irrationality rational.
My interest is not whether Heracles comes out of this tragedy as the proto-absurd
hero. Rather, I am more interested in the fact that Heracles even comes to face the
question of suicide as a result of confronting the absurd. I suggest reading Heracles’
heated debate with Theseus66 as a map in order to determine how Heracles deals,
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successfully or unsuccessfully, with the problem of philosophical suicide. As many
scholars have pointed out, interpretation of these following passages is starkly divided
among critics. Although the central concern of this debate is whether or not Heracles will
commit suicide, the question of divinity and divine justice plays a large role in how
Heracles will make his choice. Theseus is first to make the case for Heracles’ life. He
claims that even the gods of mythology commit moral blunders, yet they continue living;
therefore, Heracles should not hold himself to a moral standard beyond what the divine
hold themselves to:
Do not the gods commit adultery?
Have they not cast their fathers into chains,
In pursuit of power? Yet all the same,
Despite their crimes, they live on Olympus.
How dare you then, mortal that you are,
To protest your fate, when the gods do not?67
Arguments such as these that make light of the gods’ imperfections as an apology for
their behavior are common in Euripidean tragedies.68 While this is a rejection of suicide
by most standards, his argument is problematic, for it contains traces of philosophical
suicide. According to Camus, “understanding the world for a man is reducing it to the
human, stamping it with his seal.”69 Theseus has applied human rationale to an entity that
functions outside of the human experience. He is familiarizing irrationality in order to
satiate the human need for clarity. In addition to that, he effectively argues for Heracles
to mold himself in the image of the very thing that has irrationally destroyed him.
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The more contentious part of this debate, however, is Heracles’ response to
Theseus’ argument. In truth, Heracles’ remarks are somewhat confounding and quick to
cause drama within critical arguments. He argues,
Ah, all this has no bearing on my grief;
But I do not believe that the gods commit
Adultery, or bind each other in chains.
I never did believe it; I never shall;
If god is truly god, he is perfect,
Lacking nothing. Those are poet’s wretched lies.70
Very little if any analysis of Heracles fails to give some attention to these lines because
they create a contradiction. To believe that “if god is truly god, he is perfect” elevates an
unrealistic and, as far as this tragedy is concerned, an unqualified image of the gods and
rejects the reality of what they have proven to be. Murray accredits Verrall for making
the argument that, because Heracles rejects the idea that the gods could act with flawed
and irresponsible behavior, he essentially rejects his own suffering since it is clear that it
is a result of Hera’s jealousies.71 The major problem that arises from these lines is the fact
that, if he is rejecting this reality of the gods’ natures, then this proclamation nullifies
everything that we’ve witnessed over the course of the drama.72
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It is my opinion that no reading of these lines should contradict any aspect of the
drama’s plot or the suffering of Heracles. Rather, I propose reading these in such a way
that empowers Heracles’ recent experience with contradiction and self-alienation. It
would be irrational to take the conflict created by these lines and use it to nullify the plot
and its truth—that the gods have a role in Heracles’ suffering. It is far more logical to use
this conflict to reinforce the one thing that we know to be true: that the gods are an
irrational contradiction. By insisting that the gods are “perfect” and incapable of crime
while their crime remains visible on the stage, Heracles ironically merges two
conceptions of divinity that directly contradict one another. It’s clear that Heracles is not
actually ridding the gods of their guilt because he goes on to blame Hera only a few lines
later: “For all of us have died, all struck down by one blow of Hera’s hate.”73 It would
seem here that either Euripides or Heracles—I would argue the latter—is being ironic.74
We might read this scene as Heracles taking his revenge. By defending the reputation of
the gods in the moment he should be condemning them, Heracles actually does a more
powerful thing than what Theseus’ argument does, which merely humanizes the divine.
Heracles doubles the image of gods and simultaneously creates a dissonance within their
own being.
These argumentative possibilities aside, I want to look specifically at how
Heracles’ response progresses along the path’s division of suicide or recovery. Although
it may first appear that Heracles is defending the divine pantheon, he is actually rejecting
Theseus’ argument point for point. Kamerbeek argues that Heracles’ response ultimately
73
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“implies a repudiation of the very existence of the traditional anthropomorphic gods as
gods, but not the evil powers responsible for Heracles’ unhappy fate.”75 Unlike Theseus,
Heracles rejects any attempt that rationalizes the ordering power and thereby any human
effort that tries to impose the “human seal” on it—like the “poet’s wretched lies.” What’s
important to note, as Kamerbeek does, is that, Heracles does not actually impose any
understanding on the divine order. Rather, his response simply functions as a rejection of
one who does try to impose an understanding on it. Even in doing so, Heracles maintains,
“all this has no bearing on my grief.” There are certain powers responsible for his fate,
but what is tantamount to maintaining the absurd is that he does not try to rationalize
them. According to Kamerbeek, by the end of Heracles speech, he still implies that the
divine and the forces responsible for his suffering are nothing more than “a playground of
arbitrary evil.”76 The irrationality of the world indeed remains irrational and nothing
more.
As far as philosophical suicide is concerned, Heracles may acknowledge some
higher order or force, but he maintains his divorce from it. That is, he refrains entirely
from trying to understand it. The conclusions he reaches resonate with a greater
movement in Greek tragedy where scholars realize that divine powers outside of the
human existence gradually become more and more incomprehensible. Billings has
written that, “Greek tragedy reveals that divine substance (or essence) cannot be
individualized as pathos or knowledge.”77 Such theories confirm the grounding for the
philosophy of the absurd in these works. Although scholars like Billings may argue that
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this “demonstration of the inadequacy of Greek knowledge” results in the “end of
tragedy,”78 I can only add that while it may prove an end for one tragic tradition, this
inadequacy of knowledge immediately erects a new tradition that is equally as tragic.

The Absurd Man
Rebelling against the divine order by refusing to live in its image, Heracles moves
on to his reasons for living in the second part of his reply to Theseus. It is here that we
can test whether or not Heracles can live like Camus’ absurd man, who, “without
negating it, does nothing for the eternal. Not that nostalgia is foreign to him. But he
prefers his courage and his reasoning.”79 Once more, with his conceptions of justice and
virtue completely nullified, Heracles must come up with new reasons for living that do
nothing to reject the world’s irrationality. All the while, he must maintain everything that
his consciousness has brought to light over the course of his suffering. If he is going to
live, he must also continue to accept his duality. Otherwise, to rationalize his experience
necessarily means to reject his consciousness, meaning that he only eludes the tragedy
rather than confronts it.
Any decision to live that Heracles proposes no longer come from some
predetermined path or some generally accepted notion of virtue. Rather, as Halleran
points out “the rhetoric and context of Herakles’ statement put a clear emphasis on
Herakles’ decision to live, a decision based on his own consideration for the cowardice of
suicide.”80 Rather than restructure his life on the same precarious foundations it was built,
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Heracles instead decides to live from his own view of the world, particularly on the
notion of deilia (cowardice):
Even in my misery I asked myself,
would it not be cowardice to die?
The man who cannot bear up under fate
could never face the weapons of a man.
I shall prevail against death. I shall go
to your city. […]
I see, I must serve necessity. 81
Halleran’s analysis empowers Heracles’ conscious abilities, showing him accept life
based on his own individual experience. We could effectively read, “would it not be
cowardice to die?” to also mean, “would it not be courageous to live?” It’s worth
underscoring how unique Heracles’ newfound courage truly is in this moment. As far as
cowardice is concerned, his view of suicide here runs counter to the societal views that
would have been held by the audience: that suicide is an acceptable alternative to
dishonor.82 In fact, earlier in the plot we see the manifestation of this belief. Megara,
wanting to courageously preserve the honor of her husband’s family through suicide,
identifies cowardice in Amphitryon’s holding on to life, “Wait for worse? You love life
so much?”83 In the first part of the tragedy, the idea of the hero was still very much intact,
and so heroic ideals still held a great deal of weight. But with the symbolic contradiction
of heroism, those ideals also must be casted out. Therefore, once the tragedy has rejected
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heroic ideals through the central reversal, cowardice and courage must undergo a
complete reversal as well.84
With heroism reversed, the hero starts to become a mortal man. The importance
that this passage puts on preserving life and resisting death is all the more important
because it shows how Heracles embraces his humanness. Suddenly there is an inherent
value placed on living and a focus moved away from the eternal. The devotion to life is a
sentiment that has no place in the hearts of immortals. It is a mortal’s game because it
acknowledges an end, a need to even pose the question “to live” or “to commit suicide.”
Throughout the drama Heracles is caught between his immortal and mortal identities, but
by the end, we see what is ultimately a celebration of his humanity, and with it, its
limitations. This idea appears even before Heracles makes his choice to continue living,
for, in an earlier speech to Theseus, he chooses his mortal father: “Take no offense old
man [Amphitryon] for I count you my father now, not Zeus.”85 If the first half of the
tragedy shows us a Heracles that is clearly a divine hero, the second half shows us a
Heracles that, in his disaster, is merely a man. By the end, Heracles’ distance from the
divine could not be any larger. And from this abyss that separates them lies the evident
truth that, as Conacher eloquently writes, “the gods of myth appear as impossible while
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the moving and edifying human elements in the action succeed in transcending the
mythological nonsense.”86
Having chosen to continue living in the irrational world, he begins to reflect an
essence of the absurd man. He has faced the absurd and death alike, and he has responded
with courage and an acceptance of finite humanity. Before the end is reached, however,
we must return to the notion of the divided-self once more. In making the decision to
embrace his humanity fully, he is simultaneously forced to accept his dual self. Euripides
puts this dilemma into a tableau, as one of Heracles’ final decisions is whether or not he
will keep his bow. On the one hand, his bow represents the crime he committed against
his family, “Knocking against my ribs and always saying,/ ‘With us you murdered wife
and sons. Wearing us,/ you wear your children’s killers.’”87 On the other hand, his bow is
a symbol for all of his past glory and physical achievement, “[…] these weapons,/ with
which I did my greatest deeds in Hellas.”88 His bow is the very symbol of his internal
opposing natures, representing both his heroism and his inhumanity. Eventually he
decides, “No, they must be kept with me; but in pain I keep them.”89 This choice is of
tremendous psychological significance for Heracles. It is imperative that Heracles make
the decision that he does because by accepting his duality it means that his consciousness
is completely preserved. It’s worth noting that the acceptance of it does not relieve him of
the burden of it. Rather, it pains him to keep them because it means that, despite the fact
he has rejected suicide, he will still face an entire life of self-alienation, mirrored in his
actual exile. Unlike the standard myth, Heracles cannot go complete twelve heroic labors
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to atone for his crime. Euripides has prevented that possibility by putting the labors
beforehand. There is nothing to follow except to live on. And in choosing to live, the
inner tragedy of a broken man lives on.

Conclusion
As the last words are uttered, the hero is dead; the man, barely able to stand,
embarks upon his exile in Athens. The physical exile he faces, however, is only
secondary to the self-alienation he will have to endure. Like Thebes, now lost to him
forever, his clear conception of self is consigned to his past, and he will always remain in
that ambiguous state of the divided-self: between victim and executioner. But he has
survived his encounter with the absurd. A world seemingly ordered by justice reveals its
true emptiness by leading the virtuous hero to utter ruin. What more is Heracles but a
slow and painful sunset over man’s understanding of the world? And how is one to live in
such darkness?
In most instances, tragedy is concerned with staging the sheer presence of such a
devastating reversal. Euripides, however, is able to make Heracles his into an absurd
tragedy by staging the world’s meaninglessness over two contradicting halves and then
by giving room to the less often staged scene of confronting the consequences of that
meaninglessness. To a certain extent even, absurdism itself is tragedy prolonged.
Heracles enjoins us to imagine the philosophy of the absurd more generally as being the
space in which the ramifications of tragedy become manifest and are addressed. It is an
opaque space in which tragedies of the ancient world seldom wandered but one that the
philosophy of modernity dove into headfirst.
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Whether or not Heracles fits perfectly into the Sisyphean image of the absurd hero
is indefinable—doubtful even. For Sisyphus reaffirms his rebellion against the absurd
both eternally and heroically. Heracles stumbles as if feeling his way through the dark.
He is not a titan but simply a human. As he grieves in agony at the end, he shows how
uncomfortable the absurd appears to him. Even though Heracles has favored recovery
over suicide, no reading of this tragedy could possibly conceive of him as being happy.
This is in reference of course to the final and perplexing line of Myth of Sisyphus, “One
must imagine Sisyphus happy.”90 All the same, his consciousness having bloomed,
Heracles willingly returns to the boulder that awaits him at the bottom of his hill. Shining
the spotlight of doubt up toward the impenetrably dark skies, he draws his conclusions,
resigned to his own ephemeral, discordant light.
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INTERMEZZO
By the end of the fifth century B.C., Athens had been at the center of a long and
brutal civil war that showed from what great heights the image of man could fall. The
Peloponnesian War, lasting from c.431 to 404 B.C., saw the Delian League led by Athens
pitted against the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. Unlike the previous wars fought
against barbarian civilizations, this war saw a unified self become divided. The brutality
did not take place in some far away land but in the heart of Greek civilization—largescale atrocities committed by Greek citizens terrorizing other Greek citizens. Culminating
in the collapse of social and political unity, scholars often state that the war resulted in
“the breakdown of the old community, the overwhelming destruction of that mythic and
coherent order.”91 Both the polis and the intellectual landscape had devolved into a frenzy
of radical thought and moral discord. Though the effects were felt throughout the region,
Athens, being the losing party, saw some of the war’s worst aftermath. The Athenian
citizen, once sheltered by the walls erected from tradition and mythology, has been
exposed to the harshness of the world and to a primitive violence long forgotten. Both his
spirit and his image were in tatters, and so it his here at the sight of the hero’s ruins that
we find the desolate and hopeless frame in which Euripides created his tragedies.
Evidence of this frenzied and destructive era is passed down to us by the ancient
historian Thucydides.92 In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides captures a
microcosm of the war’s harrowing murders and the total degradation of traditional moral
values. That event is the Melian Dialogue, an account between the Athenians and the
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Melians. The Melians, a small population on an equally small island, wanted to remain
neutral to both sides and avoid participating in either campaign of murder.93 In hoping to
avoid becoming executioners, however, they merely become the victims.
The Athenians did not accept their neutrality and sent representatives to their
island, warning them that if they did not join the Delian League, they would kill the
island’s inhabitants. Diplomacy proving itself unsuccessful, the Athenians go on to
execute all the men on the island and to enslave the women and children. The dialogue
itself, however, unearths how the war brought out the complete failure of communication
and persuasion, and how, as a result, traditional principles had completely broken-down.
The defeat of the Melians lies in the fact that their argument appeals to justice,
divinity and virtue, whereas the Athenians rescind these ideas, wanting only to flex their
colonial power. The Athenian argument demoralizes justice. Separating it from virtue and
making it serve their violent means, they make it nothing more than a hallowed out
contradiction. This kind of justice sees persuasion based in morality as inferior to
physical strength and power. The Athenians espouse their irrational position claiming that
“the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to
accept,”94 and that, “our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to
conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can.”95 To
impose contemporary terminology, their argument stands entirely on the shoulders of
nihilism. They reject the existence of universal order and even bring divinity to kneel
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before meaninglessness. The Melians meet them only with traditional appeals to justice
and morality, “there should be such thing as fair play or just dealing,”96 and “nevertheless
we trust that the gods will give us fortune […] because we are standing for what is
right.”97 Being the far weaker party, the Melians can only rely on the uncertainty of the
gods and the Spartan army to save them. In one of their final remarks they “put their trust
in the fortune that the gods will send,”98 but the Athenians coldly take the last word, “you
seem to us quite unique in your ability to consider the future as something more certain
than what is before your eyes, and to see uncertainties as realities […]”99 By its
conclusion, the two parties maintain their initial opinions. Communication has failed, and
they remain divided. The Athenians fulfill their word—proving that the transformation of
justice has become permanent—and they execute all military aged men of Melos. No god
came to save them.
The convulsions of the war echoed and had a destructive effect on the Hellenic
polis, where civil war continued on a micro scale. Thucydides once more captures how
rivaling political parties were springing up in a variety of new forms, some of Athenian
influence and others of Spartan influence. Both forms were so desperate for power that
they were all too willing to exact violent revenge on the other with brand-new atrocities.
The leader too found his grave next to the hero’s. Suddenly what was once “a thoughtless
act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find in a party
member.”100 The most affected victims of these political conflicts were the citizens
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themselves. Their voice found no resonance in these violent power-lovers who sought
only to project their own and to silence those not in harmony with them. Self-interest was
reigning and justice had been usurped. Citizens left hopeless to this turmoil were left with
the impossible choice of picking between the lesser of two disgraces. The Melian peril
thus reappears in the polis, as Thucydides creates the familiar image: “the moderate part
of the citizenry perished between the two [political parties], either for not joining the
quarrel or because envy would not suffer them to escape.”101
Philosophy of this time also harbored in it a similar state of discordance. Scholars
recognize that Greece experienced a significant intellectual crisis during this 5th century
wartime era. In the city of Athens, a trend of rationalist thinking, led by the Sophists,
responded to the evident flaws that the war enumerated in the traditional ways. This
movement of questioning “spared neither the official religion nor institutions, laws or
conceptions of justice,”102 creating an overall upheaval of the intellectual foundation.
Thinkers who participated in this “revolt against religion”103 sought to move
thought away from the divine moral structures and to recognize the divide that exists
between the gods and man. Protagoras, for example, acknowledged a sense of ambiguity
and doubt growing in the space once occupied by faith. He writes, “Concerning the gods
I am not in a position to know either that they are or are not […] for there are many
things that are preventing knowledge, the obscurity of the matter and the brevity of
human life.”104 Man’s limits are recognized. The relationship between man and the gods
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devolves from a sort of understanding to a silence as if a wall separating them had
suddenly becomes palpably visible. And as the presence of the gods gradually begins to
form into an absence, the influence of traditional religion is drawn into question. Other
philosophers would look to the power of reason as their tool to return order back to their
world. Tracking the effects of this revolution on Greek Tragedy, Karl Reinhardt observes
that the Sophist thinker Anaxagoras was a foundational figure in elevating the concept of
“Mind” and logic over more theological forms of thinking. Anaxagoras viewed Mind as
“infinite and self ruling.”105 Instead of universal order being determined by some
incomprehensible force, he believed that “[Mind] arranged all things.”106 Within man
exists the power to rebuild the culture’s broken traditions, and so ideas like these gave
rise to a flourishing of humanism, all the while remembering that with man’s capacity to
rebuild lies a darker, more proven capacity to destroy.
The effects of this intellectual crisis frequently found themselves at the heart of
contemporary Greek art, particularly in the theatre of Euripides.107 Scholars believe that
his work, so often criticized for its many irrationalities, captured the essence of the
intellectual environment of the time.108 For William Arrowsmith, “the immediate, salient
fact of Euripides' theater is the assumption of a universe devoid of rational order, or of an
order incomprehensible to men.”109 Because the traditional moral structure generally
featured in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles had come into question, Euripides’
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tragic model differs greatly from the other tragedians. This decay of the old moral
tradition is coupled with a destructive transformation in how virtue is represented on the
stage. That is, with Euripidean plays, virtue frequently “tends to change to crime.”110 Is
this not exactly the fate of Heracles? He who is perhaps the epitome of divine heroism
and tried virtue (all the more in Euripides’ rendering) follows the formula that tradition
has given him and finds himself utterly ruined. Euripides’ characters are no less virtuous
per say, not in the case of Heracles at least, but the choices and actions that once led to
glory—what allowed for Orestes to receive fair and just judgment in the case of
Aeschylus, for example—now leads heroes to their falls. Tragedy perhaps no longer lies
in the fault of man, but in the intellectual system that guides them. In this way,
Euripidean tragedies like Heracles do not represent the decadence of the art form, but
rather, the decadence of the old tradition.
Not only does Euripides capture the rise of radical rationalism in his theatre but
also, as Reinhardt also points out, he makes an effort to crystallize the nostalgia that
protested the fall of traditional moral values. Reinhardt sees this most evidently in
Euripides’ use of choruses, which are conveniently always embodied by old men. He sees
that the chorus seems to be dissonant with the general aim of the tragedy. That is, while
the tragedy engages in the destruction and decay of the moral tradition, the chorus merely
wishes to escape the matter. Reinhardt writes, “Euripidean lyric no longer concentrates
on the tragic event, it intensifies, it no longer interprets, it breaks out […] wishes the
world were otherwise, becomes escapist […]”111 If once the chorus’ purpose was to
comment and aid in the interpretation of the tragedy’s events, Euripides has reinvented its
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use to now relay a dissonance with the destructive experience and the ambivalence to
engage with it. So too in Heracles, the chorus too often breaks from the plot to dwell on
the implication of old age, yearning to be young again. They make seemingly tangential
claims like, “youth I long for always,”112 and “ourselves mere words, ghost that walk.”113
These old men are anywhere but at the table where the old ways are in question. And in a
tragedy like Heracles, where the last half observes the consequences of the decay so head
on and unforgivingly, the chorus becomes virtually absent from the tragedy. That
Euripides captures both sides of the intellectual crisis vastly multiplies the tension of the
moral trials coming to life in his works. Reinhardt summarizes this tension which he
finds present throughout Euripidean theatre very well: “In antiquity there is not even a
remotely comparable analogy to the decline of meaning, the loss of centre, etc., in which
so many of our artists and analysts of art wallow—apart, perhaps, for one brief exception
[…] confined to Athens and to the period between 450 and 400 B.C.”114
There is a spirit, as Reinhardt implies, writing from the mid-20th century, of the
ancient crisis in the struggle of the modern world. Though the problems that come to light
in the 20th century needless to say are of a much greater complexity than in Athens, if
only because the 20th century saw destruction on a truly international scale—and because
these events have hardly left our critic field of vision. Two great wars and the
unfathomable atrocity of the Holocaust had dragged man to new levels of despair. As a
result, man saw the same need to confront himself and his gods once more.

112

Euripides, "Heracles," 638.
Euripides, "Heracles," 111.
114 Reinhardt, The Intellectual, 17.
113

52
The scale of this crisis being so enormous and historic records far more plentiful
than in 5th century Athens, the time and place that I wish to give exclusive attention to in
this matter is France during the 1940’s, immediately following the conclusion of the war.
After the battlefields fell silent and Paris had regained its freedom from Nazi occupation,
it became clear that the traditional image of man had utterly crumbled. During this time,
Camus wrote for and was editor of Combat, a clandestine newspaper of the French
resistance, which, after the liberation of Paris, became a public and widely read paper. In
it, he writes on the doubled nature of man and the violent darkness within, “We learned
of comrades who had their guts ripped out, their limbs torn off, and their faces kicked in.
And the men who did these things were men polite enough to give up their seats on the
subway” (August 30th, 1944).115 The everyday individual had revealed within himself an
unsettling other. And so the suspected nature of man shared in the general darkness that
had overtaken the city.
The atmosphere that Camus goes on to capture is that Paris, eager to restore an
essence of light, became open to significant change—and perhaps prematurely. The old
had to be discarded, and so “in no other country did German occupation lead […] to a
change in political, cultural and social life that was as abrupt, as dramatic, and as contrary
to the prewar situation as in France.”116 Once the rebuilding began, the ideological
current moved swiftly to condemn the remnants of the old ways. But soon enough it
became clear that this ideological recourse had just as many of its wrongs. Paris became,
much like Athens, suspended in a web of contending ideological forces. For Camus in the
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post-war, these ideologies took the form generally of communism and capitalism, tied so
closely to the divisions of Europe itself: the East and the West, respectively. And this
divide of the continent was no less present among the minds of everyday Parisians.
French scholars insist that when considering the intellectual environment of France
during this time, “one should be aware of the highly polarized atmosphere which
dominated intellectual life in France during the post-war years.”117
After Paris was liberated from German occupation, the time had come to hold
those guilty and collaborating parties accountable, and this time from 1944 to 1949
became known as Épuration légale. Hundreds of people working with the Nazis were
executed or purged from French society. Camus was initially among those who saw the
purge as necessary in order to rebuild. He writes in an article written at the beginning of
the Épuration légale “the voices of the tortured and humiliated join with ours in calling
for justice of the most pitiless and decisive kind” (November 2nd, 1944).118 But quickly it
became evident that the violence and murder resulting from the purge was just as
inscrutable as the violence the purge was reacting against. In less than a year, Camus
acknowledged the injustices of the purge and would go on to call the purge a “failure”
(August 30th, 1945).119 Similarly, French resistance groups had become starkly divided,
disagreeing about the broken country’s future.120 With individuals trying to elevate new
ideologies from the ruins of the old, society became dazed by radicalism and uncovered
new horrors and darker “others.”
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The executions of the purge did not stop despite appeals from intellectual circles.
Camus witnessed that society’s concern for delivering its raging and miscalculated justice
had created a particularly fearful environment where murder was becoming legitimized
by the purge, making the process of rebuilding futile. He writes in a series of articles
entitled “Neither Victims nor Executioners,” published in Combat in 1946, “the twentieth
century is the century of fear.”121 Citizens had become so intent on their ideas of justice
that man had lost the ability to voice his discontents. It became evident that “the world
seems to us to be led by forces blind and deaf to warnings, advice, and supplications.”122
Dialogue and persuasion ceased. A silence of continuous talking with nobody listening
overtook society, and without the ability to communicate, man was left to “quake in fear”
within the “vast conspiracy of silence.”123 The unity of humanity had been destroyed on
all levels: the globe, the state, and even the individual.
Neither able to return to how he once was nor add to the world’s violence, man
had to find new ground to stand on that rejects the hypocrisy of the world and a justice
that is irrational. In this regard, there was no escape for the moderate citizen. Radical
ideologies forced more murder, destroying the image of man while at the same time
proclaiming to save it. Man cries out, “Je suis la plaie et le couteau!” Once more, Camus
captures the unbearable contradiction that comes to befall man:
We are therefore living in utopia and contradiction, to be sure, since the world we
live in is one in which murder is legitimized […] but it seems that it can’t be
changed without running the risk of committing murder. Murder thus leads to
murder, and we will continue to live in terror either because we resign ourselves
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to it or because we seek to eliminate it by means that replace one form of terror
with another. (Saving Bodies, 1946)124
Justice was being achieved through murder, and so the path to virtue was leading to more
and more crime. Man had not even the opportunity to truly be virtuous because his
ideological environment led him to ruin either way.
The hero was dead. To Camus, it was clear that man could not legitimize murder
and take up the role of the executioner, but he also feared becoming the victim of murder
and, by his silence in reaction to the murders, admitting that human life has no value. The
fact that this is the question man is forced to ask himself—whether he will fail this way
or that way—shows that he is completely at the mercy of the broken ideological system
that guides him, for he has no other option but to fail tragically. Instead of wagering in
this suicidal game, Camus’ response was to rebel and to refuse all murder. “What is a
rebel? A man who says no, but whose refusal does not imply a renunciation.”125 These
are the very first lines of his second major, late philosophical work the Rebel, published
in 1951, nine years after the Myth of Sisyphus.
This is Paris in the eyes of Camus. And as time will go on, he will find himself
resorting to the same philosophical answer as new, more intimate conflicts arise. That is,
when large amounts of native Algerians break into a violent civil war for independence
against the French-Algerian population in the late 1950’s, he will find a similar unease
between the inevitable self-destruction proposed by either side. Algeria being his
homeland, Camus was unable to definitively take a side, and would describe this conflict
between the French and the Arabs “as if two insane people, crazed with wrath, had
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decided to turn into a fatal embrace the forced marriage from which they cannot free
themselves.”126 The French intellectual public would come to heavily criticize him for his
general silence over the course of this war. With his heart divided between the two
countries, to raise his voice would be to become both the victim and the executioner.
In a lecture given in Athens in 1955, Camus will begin, “Our age is extremely
interesting, that is to say, it is tragic.”127 What he means by this, what it means to be in a
period of tragedy, is to live when society has undertaken the arduous process of
rebuilding, when contradiction reigns, and when “the future is uncertain and the present
is dramatic.”128 Paris saw this period just as Athens did. Both places experienced the
tension of ideologies weighing on the morality of the individual and contradicting his
actions at every turn. In Athens, the literature responds, and so tragedy takes a new form.
Euripides preserves this intellectual strain, illustrating the failure of the old ways and the
uncertainty of what will follow. The literature of France responds as well, and for Camus,
he finds the roots of this transformation in a shared past, “It is in France that the first
signs of such a [tragic] renaissance is visible… the model for us remains the genius of
Greece…”129 Although Camus wrote plenty of his own theatre, these themes exist at the
heart of his fiction. He preserves the fall of man and concerns himself with the
consequences. The connections elicited from this bond founded in contradiction allow for
two literary traditions, rich completely in their own regards, to share a common breath
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across an enormous sea of time. “French writers feel for Greece, their common
fatherland…”130
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II
CLAMENCE: The Siren Of The Zuider Zee
“What sort of song was the Siren’s song? …it was a song from the abyss and once heard
it opened an abyss in every utterance and powerfully enticed whoever heard it to despair in that
abyss.”

Maurice Blanchot, The Song of the Sirens
Camus published The Fall in 1956, and it is the last major work of literature he
completed before his death. This work of fiction possesses a narrative structure that is
more experimental than those of The Stranger and The Plague, and many French literary
scholars see The Fall as being one of the foundational texts for more contemporary
experimental French narratives.131 The text is a dramatic dialogue between Jean-Baptiste
Clamence and an unnamed stranger whose voice is absent from the text. Unlike his other
works, which are so often set under the oppressive Mediterranean sun, The Fall takes
place among the dreary, foggy canals of Amsterdam. There, at the very center of the red
light district, in the shady Mexico City bar, Clamence waits, gin in hand, for a willing ear
to give the story of his fall from grace. At its core, The Fall unveils the inhumanity that
lies dormant in the self and the guilt that is present in all innocence. Like Heracles,
Clamence is confronted with the realization that he is the opposite of what he thought he
was: a deus ex machina. He goes from thinking he is innocent and invisible to the world
of judgment, to discovering that “there was something in me to judge […] and [in others]
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an irresistible vocation to judge.”132 Walking along the canals of Amsterdam, he tells of
his life in Paris as a successful and respected lawyer, of the event that occurs one night on
the Pont Royal and jeopardizes his innocence, and of how he has arrived at his present
state: a self described “judge-penitent” who finds company among the sailors and those
of even lower ranks of society, deep within the bleak hell of Amsterdam.
The events of the narrative do not unfold in any sensible or easily understood
fashion. Everything about the character of Clamence, from his proclivity for long-winded
tangents, complex literary allusions to his wholly contradictory language, contributes to
the disorienting nature of the narrative. The story takes place over several days and in a
variety of desolate settings. Walking through the canals of Amsterdam, on an excursion
into the empty Zuider Zee, and ending in the darkness of Clamence’s own home, he
subtly blends the themes of his confession with the physical world in which it is given.
The Fall progresses like the journey of Dante through the circles of hell. Leading the
way, Clamence guides this stranger to whom he tells the story through a prolonged, nonchronological reflection of his life that traverses into deeper and darker layers of memory
and observation. Immediately, the setting begins to mirror the narrative as Clamence
romanticizes the canals of Amsterdam, which, “resemble the circles of hell. When one
comes from the outside, as one gradually goes through the circles, life—and hence its
crimes—becomes denser, darker.”133 But even the imposed map of an inferno is perhaps
too generous for a text like this one.
In order to understand the narrative complexities at stake in this text, we must first
have a general understanding of Clamence himself and his fall from grace. Although
132
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Clamence begins his story addressing the question, “What is a judge-penitent?” he will
take the entire course of the narrative to arrive at his answer. He begins by reconstructing
his esteemed life in Paris. Clamence claims to have once risen to tremendous heights in
Parisian society, successfully hiding his self-interest behind an edifice of virtue. He was
once a lawyer, a noble voice of victims, always on the right side of justice. He would
offer his seat on the subway, tip his hat even to the blind people he would guide across
the street, and seize each and every opportunity to kiss the hand of a poor woman and
give her whatever money he could. Virtue took him to that “supreme summit,” satisfying
his need to “feel above” the rest of humanity and far above their judgment.134 Indeed, to
be removed from the judgment issued by the eyes of man was his sole aim in life. Having
achieved it, he was entirely free. “Bathed in a light as of Eden,” he was privy to a certain
unity and happiness in life that others were merely in pursuit of.135 Clamence saw himself
“somewhere in the flies like those gods that are brought down by machinery from time to
time to transfigure the action and give it its meaning.”136
Once high above the stage, he then plummets from his position of grace and
descends to the level of the tragic characters. One night on the Pont Royal he witnesses a
woman jump into the water, and Clamence is faced with the decision to jump in or to do
nothing.137 He does nothing. Suddenly the power of his perceived godliness weighs upon
him because he knows that in order to uphold his innocence, he has the responsibility to
save her. Clamence becomes a witness to a traumatic event, and as a result, the inaction
that freezes him has a direct impact on her fate. His unwillingness to prevent death
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affirms for him that life does not have the value that he once instilled in it. No matter
what excuse he came up with, that it was “too cold,” “too far” or, most importantly, “too
late,” he had permitted death. He was forced to retract his innocence and step into the
sight of judging eyes.138
This scene on the Pont Royal is arrived at only after much delay. Throughout the
beginning in fact, he is keen to make a spectacle of its arrival, showing glimpses of its
approach and suddenly pulling away: “I still long in my heart of hearts. I soared until the
evening when… But no, that’s another matter and it must be forgotten.”139 In issuing
these delays, Clamence insinuates that the event of the fall is coming but that we are not
there yet. This, however, is merely a trick that he is playing on his silent listener, a
listener who represents the position of the reader. The moment of the fall is not a singular
moment; rather, it has always been happening. Clamence himself makes this point much
later on when he says, “ then I realized…that that cry which had sounded over the Seine
behind me years before had never ceased, carried by the waters of the Channel, to travel
throughout the world, across the limitless expanse of the ocean, and that it had waited for
me until I encountered it.”140 In this case, the event of the fall is nothing more than a
realization of an already occurring truth. As to how this informs the delaying structure of
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the narrative, it seems as first that there will be this major event we will arrive at, but as
we continue and it never comes, it becomes apparent that he is merely tricking us.
The success of his trick is entirely dependent on the confusing nature of his
narrative structure. The chronology of time and the chronology of his narrative are not
equivalent. Instead of telling his story in a sequential manner, he goes back and forth
between events in his memory (one episode occurs one year, the next takes place three
years later, the following occurs only a short while after the first episode, and so on).
Considering that he appears to be approaching one single event in which everything
changed, it his disorienting then when he veers into episodes a few years after that event.
It is in these detour episodes that Clamence shows how he became conscious of his fallen
state; they are the scenes where he is actually falling. By placing these episodes
beforehand, his narrative possesses a realistic structure in that, once he gets to the night
of the fall, he has already fallen. The fall has always already happened. All of this is
merely to say that the detour episodes that appear before the night on the Pont Royal in
narrative but many years later in time are the episodes in which one can analyze and
understand the meaning of falling for Clamence.
He recalls a time when he entered into an altercation on the road, but the scene
does not go according to plan for Clamence. Instead of coming out on top, he is
physically beaten and embarrassed in front of a mass of onlookers. It is here that
Clamence starts to become aware of his vulnerability. He writes, “the car horns had put
the finishing touch on my embarrassment […] I could see myself getting back into the car
without a reaction, under the ironic gaze of a crowd especially delighted because, as I
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recall, I was wearing a very elegant blue suit.”141 This scene bears all of the fall’s
essential characteristics. We see a man who enters a scenario with a set of expectations
and is utterly confounded when the world reacts oppositely. There is a discordance
growing between himself and the world. The shock of his failure is overshadowed by the
moment when he realizes that there is a gaze upon him. He is beginning to see holes
forming in the veil of virtue he thought was protecting him from the world. And so his
understanding of himself begins to break down.
The elegance and grace that once characterized him are now confined merely to
the suit on his back—no longer from within. The transformation is permanent, as he adds
a little later, “it was no longer possible for me to cherish that fine picture of myself.”142
He has crossed a line and now sees his always-right self as completely lost and never able
to return to it. This realization loosens his restraint of civility, and he wants only to give
himself over to violence. He wanted to “be the stronger, and in the most elementary
way…ruling over society by force alone.”143 Like those colonizing Athenians in Melos
who subvert justice by substituting it for power, so too does Clamence forfeit the virtue
and justice-based structure that once held his world together. For him to return to that life
he once had—to rise back up on his machina—is impossible, and he knows that if he is to
enter the courtroom again, it can only be to join the side of the guilty.
In another scene that comes before the fall in the narration but after the fact in
time, the recurring sound of laughter enhances the complexity of Clamence’s
transformation. Walking home one night on the Pont des Arts, “a laugh burst out behind
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me. Taken by surprise, I suddenly wheeled around; there was no one there.”144 Though
nothing in this scene actually reveals the ways in which Clamence is guilty, the perceived
sounds of laughter show how there is something of him that is worthy of judgment. The
effects of this laughter, however, are incredibly far-reaching. As he regards the laughter
just a few days later, he says, “I thought a little about that laugh, for a few days, then
forgot about it. Once in a great while, I seemed to hear it within me.”145 The experience
of laughter shifts from being an outward event to an inner event occurring explicitly at
the psychological level. It prompts him to begin a reflexive examination, and through
this, he becomes more and more self-conscious. Avi Sagi points out that laughter is the
experience through which Clamence comes to discover his self-consciousness.146
Laughter then has the effect of “disturbing and subverting quotidian comforts. Laughter
directs Clamence to himself, to the voyage supposed to discover the hidden, primary truth
about human existence, namely that the human being is a dual creature.”147 So as he
returns home from that night on the Pont des Arts, Clamence looks into the mirror and
observes that, “my reflection was smiling in the mirror, but it seemed to me that my smile
was double.”148 His sense of self has literally become doubled and his self-consciousness
has completely taken root. Suddenly the coherence of his character is disturbed, and he
observes an “other” within himself.
The discovery of the dual self becomes even clearer to Clamence as his “voyage”
of introspection progresses. Laughter begins to appear throughout his daily life,
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disrupting the actions that had become so fluid and habitual to him. Now when he is with
a woman or giving some speech in front of the court, an internal laughter breaks in and
reveals to him that he is not one coherent being; there is the division between the internal
self and the self that is presented.149 In other words, he realizes the irony in the fact that
he can give a speech about justice while knowing that he himself is on the side of the
guilty. But at the same time that this “voyage” interrupts daily life, it has the capacity to
retroactively take its effect upon memories. Clamence himself quite clearly confirms this
when he says,
To begin with that perpetual laugh and laughers had to teach me to see clearly
within me and to discover at last that I was not simple […] after prolonged
research on myself, I brought out the fundamental duplicity of the human being.
Then I realized, as a result of delving in my memory, that modesty helped me to
shine, humility to conquer, and virtue to oppress.150
The repudiation of the “simple” perception of self is revelatory for Clamence. The
“simple” self is a self that does not see itself as doubled or divided but as fixed and
singular. This discovery prompted by laughter forces him to observe that not only is he
not “simple,” but also that any perception of simplicity has only been an illusion. The
dual self was merely hidden behind the “simple,” behind a mirage of acting.
Clamence learns that he can wear the mask: the mask of modesty, the mask of
humility, or the mask of virtue. The gesture of tipping his hat to the blind people on the
street is revealed not to be a kindness at all—a performance instead. It is clearly not at all
intended for whom he gives it, for they cannot even see it. Rather, he tips his hat for the
audience of onlookers. Once he learns that he can be ironic, that he can say one thing and
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mean another, the self becomes completely fluid in that there is no limit to what form it
can take.151 And so by the end, Clamence reveals himself as the actor: “Don’t take my
emotional outburst or my ravings too seriously. They are controlled.”152 Can he not also
wear the mask of the confessor? The identity of the authentic Clamence behind the mask
is as indeterminable as the identity of his silent interlocutor. The uncomfortable reality
that the reader must face from this point on in the narrative is that Clamence can become
whoever serves him best, a concern that becomes darker and graver as the text
progresses.
At this point, I want to pause in order to truly examine the nature of “falling” in
this text. It’s clear that Clamence’s fall is not one strictly of innocence and guilt, but more
generally a transformation between states of self-consciousness. While the fall of
Clamence has many similarities to the Christian conception of the fall, many
characteristics of his experience are unexplained by a purely religious reading. At its
core, the Christian idea is a transition from one state of being to a lesser state of being,
and this transition is centered on the concept of original sin and the loss of innocence. In
its most basic premise, original sin provides that there is a singular and central event that
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warrants the exile from paradise and the need for salvation. What’s central to this idea is
that there is a movement from one place to another, from paradise to exile. Even once
Adam and Eve are forced to leave paradise, the remainder of their lives is centered on
achieving salvation so that they may eventually return to their original, perfect state.
Clamence may structure his narrative in order to make it seem as if there was a central
event from which he transformed to his fallen state, but this is not the case. When he
undergoes his fall, he merely comes to the realization that he has always been fallen. It is
not a movement from one place to another. Rather, it is a realization that he is not where
he thought he was. Clamence’s experience of the fall maintains that paradise never
existed and therefore cannot be returned to. The possibility for salvation is thus ruined—
for Eden has been forgotten. This is a truth that Clamence provides in his chilling last
words: “‘O young woman, throw yourself into the water again so that I may a second
time have the chance of saving us both!’… But let’s not worry! It’s too late now. It will
always be too late. Fortunately!”153
What the Christian approach cannot illuminate about the text, Martin Heidegger’s
view of the fall possibly can. Heidegger’s idea extends beyond the basic opposition of
innocence and guilt. The idea of falling that he focuses on in Being and Time is far more
existential. He explains falling as “a most exaggerated ‘self-dissection.’”154 Avi Sagi,
who also observes Heideggerian characteristics in Clamence’s fall, defines Heidegger’s
fall as a “shift from an authentic to inauthentic existence” where “an authentic existence
is one in which human consciousness is transparent...and a state of fall is one of self
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alienation.”155 Clamence’s conception of falling does in fact lead him to a sense of selfalienation, but at the same time, he shows that the “inauthentic self” is the only true self
and that the “authentic self” is nothing more than an illusion of the mind. When
Clamence proclaims that in falling he discovered the “fundamental duplicity of the
human being,” he insinuates that the true nature of man is to be fallen. The actual event
of falling is not one of becoming or transforming but simply of realizing: he is not so
much becoming alienated as much as he is merely realizing his alienation. Nonetheless,
the alienation resulting from the fall is a product of identity’s fragmentation. Heidegger’s
idea then that the fall results in a state of consciousness that “is characterized by
turbulence”156 is no less true for Clamence. He suggests this condition in himself
throughout the text. His sense of self becomes tangled in duplicity, and everything about
his reality, both conscious and physical, appears ambiguous and incomprehensible.
Once Clamence has learned that he has always been falling, he is forced to
confront the complimentary truth that there is no end to his fallen state. This idea
originates from Maurice Blanchot’s reading of The Fall, for whom Clamence’s fall is an
“eternal” one, arguing that, “We console ourselves for falling by determining in our
imagination the point at which we would have begun to fall… A suffering without
reason, an exile without a kingdom, a flight without vanishing point cannot be
tolerated.”157 The notion of falling that his reading proposes is that, because there is
neither a beginning nor an end to the fall, any sense of progression or trajectory
associated with the movement of falling is entirely an illusion of a hopeful mind. In this
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case, the metaphorical landscape of falling is one in which all indications of distance or
space are completely blurred. Blanchot’s conception of falling is visible in the setting in
which Clamence gives his story. Specifically, the waters of the Zuider Zee (along which
Amsterdam lies) not only capture the spatial ambiguity of the fall, but they also come to
represent the anti-Eden, that is, where the fallen individuals find their home. Riding along
in a boat through the foggy sea, nothing is defined, everything is just an ambiguous mass:
But the Zuider Zee is a dead sea, or almost. With its flat shores, lost in the fog,
there’s no saying where it begins or ends. So we are streaming along without any
landmark […] We are making progress yet nothing is changing. It’s not
navigation but dreaming.158
The distortion of space in this scene creates the illusion that Clamence is suspended in a
void. The fog obstructs everything, making it entirely impossible to determine a position
or limits. Not knowing “where it begins or ends,” the sea itself represents the existential
abyss from which there is no exit. That Clamence recognizes this same concept of
movement yet without any progress mirrors his exact experience of falling: that there is
no trajectory, no start, middle, or end. Clamence is merely left to wander in it as if in
some eternal purgatory. And so this “dead sea” becomes the land of his exile. Unlike
paradise, the Zuider Zee is merely an absence, a “negative landscape…universal
obliteration, everlasting nothingness made visible.”159 The light that Clamence once saw
himself bathed in whilst in his Eden has been replaced by an impenetrable, dull haze.
Once Clamence has fallen into the tangled web of self-consciousness, there is no
returning to the coherent order of self he once possessed. As he comes to discover his
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identity as an actor, he thus learns that he has no fixed identity at all. The self becomes an
infinite sea: it emodies everything, and therefore, nothing. Ironically, the Zuider Zee truly
“is a dead sea.” Although the text makes no acknowledgment of this idea, the sea is a
perfect metaphor for the divided-self. It mirrors Clamence in that it was once a real sea in
reality, but the construction of a major highway closed it off and divided it into two, and
neither section kept the original name.160 What was once the mouth of the Zuider Zee
became the Wadden Sea and the remainder became known as the Ĳsselmeer, and so as
they became no longer unified they lost the name that signified their unification: Zuider
Zee.161 Clamence is also one who, after he realized himself doubled, abandoned his
original name, which he reveals very early on.162 Although he does not specify what his
name once was, the fact that it is not even presented to the reader is a further sign of how
lost and irretrievable that singular and original identity is. This reoccurring motif then of
lost original identity is another way of compounding the experience self-alienation.
Likewise, the fact the Clamence, like the sea, is capable of adopting a new name
reaffirms his identity as the actor, for whom identity is completely fluid.
Taking a step back from the narrative, the perpetual feeling of approaching
something that one cannot make out that characterizes the voyage through the Zuider Zee
shares many characteristics with the greater narrative structure of The Fall. As Clamence
tells his tale and leads up to the moment of the fall he is merely “making progress yet
nothing is changing,” revealing by the end that the fall is not an event that can be arrived
at because it is not an event at all. Considering that Camus himself referred to The Fall as
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a récit instead of a novel, I find the Blanchotian idea of the récit to be particularly
illuminating about this endless-approach narrative structure. Unlike the novel, “the récit,
in general, is the narrative of an exceptional event that escapes the forms of daily time
and the world of ordinary truth, perhaps of all truth.”163 He compares this to the song that
Sirens give to sailors on the sea, a song that entices sailors to cross a distance that can
never be crossed—to embark upon a journey without and end. So too for the moment of
the fall, Clamence may create the illusion of approaching it, but he can never actually
arrive at it because it is a non-temporal event. His narrative is a trompe l’oeil: the fall is
happening before our eyes and has always been happening, but we do not realize it
because we are constantly expecting it. Therefore, the récit is the only narrative structure
in which Clamence’s conception of falleness can be retold. The narrative he gives then
takes the form not of a narration, but of a wandering without destination, as the récit “is
not the narration of an event, but the approach of this event, the place where it is called
on to unfold, an event still to come.”164
But the greater problem that is consistently at stake with this récit is that just
when it seems like we are finally reading Clamence, the suspicion arises that he is merely
trapping us in his complex narrative—acting the confession rather than giving it. As a
narrator, Clamence is painfully skilled in the art of détournement. By reversing the
temporality of events with prolonged excursions into his memories and thereby insisting
upon the non-temporality of the fall, Clamence prevents the reader from grasping a clear
understanding of his narrative. Thus, what Clamence is actually hijacking is the reader’s
ability to analyze his story succinctly and to issue judgments of his or her own, evading
163 Blanchot, Maurice. The Book to Come, Translated by Lydia Davis (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2003), 6.
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our gaze merely by distorting our view. But to avoid our gaze is not enough; in fact, he is
merely redirecting our own gaze to face ourselves.
Each of these narrative hijackings is successful in distorting our perception of the
fall, but the greatest détournment of the entire narrative is that of the fall itself. The
central question posed to Clamence is not about his fall, but rather, “What is a judgepenitent? …But first I must set forth a certain number of facts that will help you
understand my story.”165 Yet it is these tangential “facts” which become the material for
which Clamence will implicate the reader into his guilt. We might pause if only for a
second to consider the role of the silent interlocutor. Not only is he never heard from, but
also we learn nothing about him besides that he bears some similarities to Clamence
himself. Therefore, he is no one, and at the same time, he is everyone. A total absence, he
functions merely as a vacant placeholder so that the reader may easily insert him or
herself into the seat of Clamence’s audience. In this case, whatever effect Clamence
produces upon his companion, he produces on the reader simultaneously. The actual
implication occurs in the telling of his fall. As Clamence is unfolding his intricate and
confusing narrative, he is performing a sleight-of-hand and tailoring his own story,
“adapting my words to my listener,” so that the portrait of his confession is of “all and of
no one.”166 By the time the reader learns the truth of his profession and the intent of his
monologue, it is too late to retreat:
Covered with ashes, tearing my hair, my face scored by clawing, but with piercing
eyes, I stand before all humanity recapitulating my shames without losing sight of
the effect I am producing, and saying: “I was the lowest of the low.” Then
imperceptibly I pass from the “I” to the “we”… the more I accuse myself, the
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more I have the right to judge you. Even better, I provoke you into judging
yourself, and this relieves me of that much of the burden… I shall listen, you may
be sure, to your own confession with a great feeling of fraternity.167
He subtly transforms the portrait that was ostensibly of himself into a mirror in which we
become the subject of judgment. We may then, at his will, embark upon our own
confession at the conclusion of his. He creates a trap into which his audience easily falls.
Part of his success in trapping his reader is owed to the heightened sense of
intimacy that he gradually creates throughout the narrative. For example, in addressing
the interlocutor, he slowly drops the formalities so that the “Monsieur” on the first page
transforms into “cher monsieur,”168 to “cher ami,”169 and toward the end, “mon cher.”170
Even spatially, the narrative begins in a shady public bar, and as he seems to reveal more
about himself, the setting too becomes more intimate so that the last chapter takes place
in his home by his bedside. In doing so, Clamence cultivates the perfect environment for
his audience to let down their guards—to look into their own mirror and see their smile
doubled.
The confession of the interlocutor is the true prize for Clamence because it
guarantees the slow acquiescence of his own freedom. Clamence recognizes that to
confess is to submit oneself to judgment, but he fosters the illusion that freedom is in fact
not freedom at all and that submission is where true freedom lies: “Ah, mon cher, for
anyone who is alone, without God and without a master, the weight of the days are
dreadful. Hence one must choose a master…when we are all guilty, that will be true
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democracy.”171 With each confession he produces he converts his audience into a
consciousness that is aware of the duplicitous self, and so he welcomes one more
individual with open arms into that familiar self-alienating expulsion. But Clamence has
made somewhat of a home in exile, “I have accepted duplicity instead of being upset
about it.”172 Having rushed to his own judgment as the judge-penitent he has adapted
himself to this banishment, and so as the world arrives, somewhat paralyzed by the
confusion warranted by the divided-self, he’ll have already created his kingdom, and he
will ironically become the master in exile, a “prophet in the empty desert.”173 It is all the
more appropriate that his new name should be Jean-Baptiste Clamence, bearing an
intentional likeness to John the Baptist. He leads the interlocutor into this kingdom of his
by baptizing him in the Zuider Zee, that “holy water-font”174 that for him is the utter
symbol of his guilt and estrangement. And so as he addresses his interlocutor one last
time, he does so with the utmost irony: “cher Maître,”175 he says, giving his audience the
final illusion of freedom they will ever have, even though in truth, it is too late, and they
have already long lost it. Like the Song of the Siren, “awakening the hope and desire for
a wonderful beyond, [but] this beyond represented only a desert,”176 Clamence lulls his
listener straight through the gates of eternal exile.
By the finale, the clearest view of Clamence’s kingdom arises, and it is in all
ways the anti-Eden. Once he fought on the side of justice, but now, in this fallen world,
Clamence has enslaved justice; in fact, it’s in the cupboard. When Clamence reveals that
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he is in possession of the missing panel piece entitled “the Just Judges” from the
“Adoration of the Lamb” altarpiece by the artists Hubert and Jan van Eyck, he implicates
his audience in the crime. In the altarpiece, various groups of religious people are
traveling to see the holy Lamb. The central figure of the piece itself, the Lamb is a
parallel of Jesus Christ and signifies the state of innocence. The scene represents
redemption, the return to the pre-fallen state.177 In the cupboard, those judges are
supposedly on their way to meet the Lamb of innocence and to take part in redemption,
but like the wanderer on the Zuider Zee, their search will be eternal. According to
Clamence, “justice being definitively separated from innocence… I have the way clear to
work according to my convictions. With a clear conscious I can practice the difficult
profession of judge-penitent.”178 A sense of internal clarity only returns to Clamence
once he has disturbed and contradicted the world around him. He has made justice mirror
his discordant state by alienating it from the object that predicates it: innocence.
In his dark home in the center of Amsterdam, he has put the judges in his own
little-ease, that Middle Ages torture device that limits all movements, prohibiting the
search for the Lamb. From inside the little-ease, “through the unchanging restrictions that
stiffen [the] body, the condemned man learned that he was guilty,”179 and so justice is
made into a contradiction. Locked up, the “Just Judges” will be forever on their search
for the Lamb of innocence, forever approaching redemption, but never will they arrive. A
copy of the panel has taken the place of the stolen original on the altarpiece in St. Bavon
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Cathedral. Mankind has doubled it, and the original piece has been expelled to the place
where “one is forgotten for life.”180
***
Revealing to us his secret, showing his proof that the “Just Judges” are lost and
that justice is ruined, he baptizes his reader once and for all and welcomes him to a bleak
life of exile. Clamence has done everything that he can at this point to prepare his listener
to begin his or her own confession. The narrative has come to a complete circle. Just as
one confession ends the next one is to begin, and presumably this will continue through
eternity. As the récit ends, we do not arrive anywhere, but instead we begin again, always
beginning—ending on yet another beginning. In these last pages, Clamence makes the
joke that a day might come when he will reveal his stolen painting to the wrong person,
that they will take him away, and that justice will be restored: “I’d be decapitated, for
instances […] I’d be saved.”181 But that day will never come, for even he knows that “It’s
too late now. It will always be too late. Fortunately!”182 Even if such an arrest were made,
Clamence knows that there would be nothing to return to, no actual paradise that existed
before the fall.
But what about those judges locked in the cupboard—are they not familiar? Once
responsible for carrying out justice, they’ve been exiled, forced to realize their guilt.
There, in the little-ease, they find the bones of Heracles. Justice exists in the same place
at the end of both The Fall and Heracles. In the Euripidean universe, Heracles too once
carried out the ways of justice and is betrayed by a justice that rejects itself. Banished, the
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judge becomes the penitent. And like Clamence, who also stood on the side of justice
until his ruin, Heracles too experiences the alienation of the divided-self. Never will he be
able to return from his physical expulsion to Athens, and in his consciousness he will
always be both the victim and the executioner.
It is true that both the tragedy and the récit end in a more impenetrable darkness
than from where they start. But the darkness at the end of Heracles is merely made
deeper by the revelations of The Fall. While it may seem like these protagonists enter
into exile, they have always been there. For them, the tragedy is only when they realize it.
All that remains is to fall, and to keep falling. With no beginning or end to it, Heracles
and Clamence, the “Just Judges” and ourselves—for we are among them—are left to
wander in the limitless, fog-filled void of a dark and confusing sea.
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EPILOGUE
Today, if you were to walk into the St. Bavo’s Cathedral, which is located in the
idyllic town of Ghent, Belgium, you could find the “Ghent Altarpiece” on display behind
a thick pane of glass in the small but secured Villa Chapel. On the bottom left hand side
of the panel you can find the “Just Judges,” only feet from the Lamb of innocence. All
twelve of the inside panels appear to be in complete, unbroken harmony with each other.
But do not be fooled. It is only meant to look as if they are in harmony. The panel of the
“Just Judges” on display is a fake, painted by an art forger on the back of an old
bookshelf. The whereabouts of the original are completely unknown.
As Clamence accurately narrated, the “Just Judges” was truly stolen on the night
of April 10th, 1934 from the Ghent Cathedral. Its absence from the altarpiece immediately
caused a stir in official and civilian circles throughout the country. But whereas many
paintings in that period that were stolen simply disappeared without a trace, the thief
began reaching out. In a matter of days after it was stolen, the Bishop of Ghent began
receiving ransom notes from an anonymous individual, giving only the initials D.U.A.
The thief asks for money, of course (one million Belgian francs from the church to be
exact), but what is more unusual is that in his letters he shows as much concern for
getting the panel returned as he does for receiving the money. He is aware not only of its
monetary significance but also of its symbolic significance, and it is from the latter that
he works his leverage. He writes in his first letter to the Bishop, “[the location] is indeed
only known by one person. This fact is the only thing that should interest you because it

79
implies terrifying possibilities.”183 The ominous threat in his words reveals the greater
truth—a truth that the thief is aware of—that the painting itself is hardly the object being
ransomed. What’s at stake is graver. He has created a discord in the symbolic harmony of
redemption and salvation, and it is the possibility of restoring that harmony that he holds
in his singular possession.
As time goes by and letters are passed back and forth, the Bishop and the Belgian
authorities gradually retreat into silence. They cannot meet the thief’s demands and, as he
sees it, they have become relatively indifferent to the matter. In his later letters, he shows
a disappointment not because he will not see the money, for over the course of their
negotiations he lowered the ransom price again and again in order to have them commit
to the cause. Rather he becomes frustrated that they are unwilling to pursue the “Just
Judges” unconditionally. He writes in his second to last letter:
After having tried everything within our power, and despite your continuously
repeating and impossible to realize answers, I believe I fully performed my duty
as a Leader... and I withdraw the order to my friends in order not to take revenge
yet. They are free and just like them and you, I can only wait and see what will
happen. I have clean hands and I leave with an easy mind, and I take my terrible
secret with me. Please accept, Monsignor, my honorable regards as well as my
regret that you did not treat the people in this historical matter, with enough
dignity.184
The thief becomes the prophet. Pleased to reveal the shortcomings of those who claim
themselves to be on the right side of justice, he feels himself accomplished in showing
man’s unwillingness to restore the judges to innocence.
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Was this perhaps not the intention of his theft all along? It was nothing more than
an experiment—a confession of sorts. Having made his case to the Bishop, having done
his part, he has made himself open; his “hands are clean.” It is a miraculous and familiar
trick. He merely made himself guilty first in order to prove everyone else guilty in the
end. Civilization has lost its jewel not because it was stolen but because we were
indifferent to its absence. The thief has revealed the duality of the people. Claiming to
value this precious work and its significance over all else, they refuse to meet the simple
needs necessary to restore it. The thief withdraws, “happy to have been of help.”185
The letters from the thief cease. The Bishop does not meet the thief’s demands.
Those “terrifying possibilities” that he initially made reference to in the beginning
regretfully become realized. The suspected thief was a stockbroker with a failing heart
named Arsène Goedertier. He dies nearly eight months after the painting was stolen. On
his deathbed he purportedly revealed the location of a final letter, which had never been
sent, hidden in the drawer of his desk. Approaching the end, his tone becomes evermore
damning:
[…] you dare to take the responsibility to write that your proposal is ‘to take it or
leave it.’ In such circumstances it is dreadful to dare to write such a thing. We
know that one usually says such a thing when it concerns the trading of objects
without value or of minor importance. But when it concerns one of the most
valuable objects in the world […] the disappearance of which will be registered in
history as an irreparable occurrence, dare to write: ‘Take it or leave it,’ without
bearing in mind the material responsibility, that is incomprehensible.186
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The thief has issued his judgments. We can only imagine that he would have admittedly
taken some pleasure in being caught, arrested—to be decapitated and thus, be saved. But
as he dies, the secret dies with him. He reveals that, “The judges rest in a place where
neither I nor anybody else can take it without catching the attention of the public.”187 It’s
too late.
Nearly a century later, no progress has been made on discovering the location of
the “Just Judges.” Although a copy stands in its place, the altarpiece stands symbolically
incomplete. In 2010 the artwork began restoration, and it was found that the forged panel,
painted in 1945 and therefore the newest panel by hundreds of years, is in the direst
shape. Its paint flakes more than the older pieces, and the wood on which it was painted
is rotting.188 Its true, inferior nature shows through from behind its cracks more and more
each day. As for finding the “Just Judges” and restoring them back to their rightful place
restored with the Lamb, a detective remains assigned to the case to this day.189 The
search, it seems, will never end.
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